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ABSTRACT 
 The Arctic is an emerging theater of strategic importance. Opening sea lines of 
communication and increased access to Arctic resources are forcing U.S. strategic 
planners and decision makers to address regional challenges. The reemergence of polar 
great power competition, coupled with rapid climate change, has drastically altered the 
strategic demand for space capabilities within the region. This thesis explored how the 
United States might benefit from a cooperative space strategy for the Arctic and whether 
the United States must build collaborative space capacity within the Arctic to achieve its 
stated strategic objectives within the region. While U.S. strategists have presented a clear 
case for strategic engagement and cooperation in the High North, the United States 
currently lacks a comprehensive Arctic strategy for space that encompasses the 
challenges, opportunities, and existing capabilities and gaps of U.S. allies and partners in 
the region related to the space domain. Although U.S. Arctic strategies have consistently 
highlighted the fundamental necessity to enhance Arctic domain awareness and the 
political and geostrategic challenges that the United States faces within the Arctic region, 
these strategies lack an overarching framework for allied and partner space cooperation to 
achieve these effects. This thesis investigates how the United States builds allied and 
partner space cooperation in the Arctic to reinforce U.S. strategic interests in the region. 
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A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION 
This thesis seeks to answer how the United States might benefit from a cooperative 
space strategy for the Arctic and whether the United States must build space collaborative 
capacity within the Arctic to achieve its stated strategic objectives within the region in an 
era of polar great power competition. While U.S. strategists have presented a clear case for 
strategic engagement and cooperation in the High North, the United States currently lacks 
a comprehensive Arctic strategy for space that encompasses the challenges, opportunities, 
and existing capabilities and gaps of U.S. allies and partners in the region related to the 
space domain. Although U.S. Arctic strategies have consistently highlighted the 
fundamental necessity to enhance Arctic domain awareness and the political and 
geostrategic challenges that the United States faces within the Arctic region, these 
strategies lack an overarching framework for allied and partner space cooperation to 
achieve these effects.1 This thesis investigates how the United States builds allied and 
partner space cooperation in the Arctic to reinforce U.S. strategic interests in the region.  
To capture the full scale and scope of Arctic geopolitical and strategic issues and 
opportunities is well beyond the scope of this thesis. Rather, its purpose is to analyze how 
space operations and associated capabilities contribute to achieving desired national 
strategic objectives outlined in Arctic policies, and examine how the United States can 
benefit from coalition operations in space through Arctic-state bilateral cooperation, Arctic 
regional multilateral cooperation, or Arctic-centric intergovernmental cooperation 
inclusive of non-Arctic actors. Additionally, this thesis seeks to understand the geopolitical 
challenges to space operations within the Arctic both terrestrially and within the space 
domain and analyze Arctic allied and partner space capabilities through comparative case 
studies that seek to understand their potential motivations or apprehension to future 
collaborative space initiatives.  
 
1 White House, National Strategy for the Arctic Region (Washington, DC: White House, 2013), 6, 
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/docs/nat_arctic_strategy.pdf.  
2 
The policy recommendations at the conclusion of this thesis are intended to inform 
the Office of Ocean and Polar Affairs (OPA)2 and Office of Space Affairs3 within the 
Department of State’s Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific 
Affairs (OES), U.S. Northern Command (USNORTHCOM) as the Department of 
Defense’s (DOD) Arctic Capability Advocate, the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) as the lead 
agency for homeland security in the Arctic, U.S. Space Command (USSPACECOM) as 
the DOD’s geographic combatant command for space, and the U.S. Space Force (USSF) 
as the DOD’s “military service that organizes, trains, and equips space forces in order to 
protect U.S. and allied interests in space and to provide space capabilities to the joint 
force.”4 This research is significant due to the increasing political and geostrategic value 
of the Arctic as an arena for polar great power competition and homeland defense. The 
goal of this research is to form the basis of a new, competitive, and realistic United States 
national space strategy for the Arctic. 
B. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH QUESTION 
The Defense Space Strategy from 2020 clearly articulates that the current “U.S. 
defense space enterprise was not built for the current strategic environment.”5 The Arctic 
is an emerging theater of strategic importance. Opening sea lines of communication and 
increased access to Arctic resources are forcing U.S. strategic planners and decision makers 
to address regional challenges. The Arctic’s unique operating environment and harsh 
conditions require innovative solutions to address the emerging challenges and 
 
2 The U.S. Department of State website states, “[The Office of Ocean and Polar Affairs (OPA)] is 
responsible for formulating and implementing U.S. policy on international issues concerning the ocean, the 
Arctic, and the Antarctic (Department of State, n.d.).” 
3 The U.S. Department of State website states, “The Office of Space Affairs carries out diplomatic and 
public diplomacy efforts to strengthen American leadership in space exploration, applications, and 
commercialization by increasing understanding of, and support for, U.S. national space policies and 
programs and to encourage the foreign use of U.S. space capabilities, systems, and services (Department of 
State, n.d.).” 
4 “United States Space Force Mission,” U.S. Space Force, accessed March 14, 2021, 
https://www.spaceforce.mil/About-Us/About-Space-Force/Mission/. 
5 Department of Defense, Defense Space Strategy Summary (Washington, DC: Department of 
Defense, 2020), 3, https://media.defense.gov/2020/Jun/17/2002317391/-1/-
1/1/2020_DEFENSE_SPACE_STRATEGY_SUMMARY.PDF. 
3 
opportunities.6 The reemergence of polar great power competition, coupled with rapid 
climate change, has drastically reinvigorated the strategic demand for space capabilities in 
the region. The harsh Arctic operating environment requires national security planners to 
develop greater capabilities and capacity to, from, and through the space domain. Space 
operations and associated capabilities are uniquely qualified to meet operating challenges 
in the Arctic with their reduced physical footprint, large coverage areas, and ability to span 
across international boundaries. Furthermore, these space capabilities directly address key 
U.S. strategic capability gaps within the Arctic by enhancing multi-domain awareness, 
facilitating command, control, communications, intelligence, surveillance, and 
reconnaissance (C3ISR), and providing increased missile defense and early-warning 
capacity within the region.7  
The Arctic is a geostrategic region increasingly important to U.S. economic 
prosperity and national security. Opening to insecurity and opportunity, the Arctic is 
experiencing dynamic change in the physical, economic, and security environments. Rapid 
climate change and a reduction in sea ice coverage is increasing access to new maritime 
lines of communication and expanding competition for resources within the region. A 
reemerging Russian military presence and rising Chinese economic investment in the 
region is witnessing a rise in tensions and a reduction in U.S. geopolitical influence. 
Consequently, the post-Cold War era of Arctic exceptionalism characterized by peace and 
stability and largely focused on scientific research and exploration is now being 
transformed into an era characterized by significant environmental, security, and economic 
geostrategic challenges.8  
 
6 This thesis uses the definition of the Arctic codified in U.S. Code, Title 15, Commerce and Trade, 
Chapter 67, Arctic Research and Policy, Section 4111 (15 U.S.C. § 4111), which designates the Arctic as 
“all United States and foreign territory north of the Arctic Circle and all United States territory north and 
west of the boundary formed by the Porcupine, Yukon, and Kuskokwim Rivers; all contiguous seas, 
including the Arctic Ocean and the Beaufort, Bering, and Chukchi Seas; and the Aleutian chain.”  
7 Department of the Air Force, The Department of the Air Force Arctic Strategy (Washington, DC: 
Department of the Air Force, 2020), 8, https://www.af.mil/Portals/1/documents/2020SAF/July/ 
ArcticStrategy.pdf. 
8 “Space for the Arctic,” The European Space Agency, last modified March 15, 2012, 
https://www.esa.int/Applications/Observing_the_Earth/Space_for_our_climate/Space_for_the_Arctic. 
4 
The United States, by virtue of Alaska, is an Arctic nation with “substantial 
political, economic, energy, environmental, and other interests in the region.”9 Despite the 
strategic importance of the Arctic to U.S. national interests, there remain significant 
capability gaps related to communications, multi-domain awareness, access, and presence 
within the region. According to a Government Accountability Office (GAO) assessment of 
the DOD’s 2011 Arctic Report, the “DOD has identified Arctic capability gaps, but lacks 
a comprehensive approach to addressing Arctic capabilities.”10 It goes on to say,  
While DOD’s Arctic Report assessed a relatively low level of threat in the 
Arctic region, it noted three capability gaps that have the potential to hamper 
Arctic operations. These gaps include (1) limited communications, such as 
degraded high-frequency radio signals in latitudes above 70°N because of 
magnetic and solar phenomena; (2) degraded global positioning system 
performance that could affect missions that require precision navigation, 
such as search and rescue; and (3) limited awareness across all domains in 
the Arctic because of distances, limited presence, and the harsh environment 
[emphasis added].11  
Other key challenges identified within the report include shortfalls in ice and 
weather reporting and forecasting, and limitations in C3ISR due to a lack of available 
ground, sea, air, and space assets. These complex regional problems require more than a 
nationalistic approach to address these critical capability needs. The GAO assessment 
concludes that “addressing near-term gaps is essential for [the] DOD to have the key 
enabling capabilities it needs to communicate, navigate, and maintain awareness of activity 
in the region.”12 It also notes that “the long lead time associated with capability 
development, particularly procurement of space-based assets and ships, requires a 
 
9 Ronald O’Rourke et al., Changes in the Arctic: Background and Issues for Congress, CRS Report 
No. R41153 (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2021, 1, 
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R41153.pdf. 
10 John Pendleton, Arctic Capabilities: DOD Addressed Many Specified Reporting Elements in Its 
2011 Arctic Report but Should Take Steps to Meet Near- and Long-term Needs, GAO-12-180 (Washington, 
DC: Government Accountability Office, 2012), 17, https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a554921.pdf. 
11 Pendleton, Arctic Capabilities, 17. 
12 Pendleton, 21. 
5 
deliberate risk-based investment strategy” and cited the “importance of collaboration to 
develop Arctic capabilities.”13 
Although multiple studies and policy statements have identified and reemphasized 
the same challenges of the 2011 Arctic Report over the past decade, identified capability 
gaps have primarily remained underfunded and unresolved. The Arctic remains an austere 
operating environment with extreme environmental and technical challenges and limited 
existing capabilities to respond to increasing threats within the region. This thesis assumes 
that the lack of progress on key space capabilities and developmental concepts associated 
to the Arctic region can be attributed to the propensity of most strategic planners to view 
space security and space capability development concepts from a purely nationalistic 
perspective. As argued by Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) professor and space policy 
expert Dr. James Clay Moltz, the United States instead should be fostering the concept of 
an allied space “network.” He goes on to say that “by spreading capabilities among allies 
in space through the creation of inter-operable, redundant networks of satellites, including 
in the military sector, space-based partnerships could reduce costs, lessen vulnerability, 
and raise the challenges facing would-be attackers.”14 He also notes that “given the 
tightening financial situation in most countries today and in the United States itself, pooling 
resources may be the most effective means of building new capabilities.”15  
Although current space policy strategies are not region specific due to the cross-
boundary nature of the space domain, this thesis investigates how a national comprehensive 
space cooperation strategy specific to the Arctic region would address Arctic-specific 
challenges with international partners that have vested interests in Arctic affairs. The DOD 
has taken the lead with the release of the Department of the Air Force’s 2020 Arctic 
Strategy to address national space security priorities within the region.16 However, this 
 
13 Pendleton, 23. 
14 James Clay Moltz, Coalition Building in Space: Where Networks are Power (Ft. Belvoir, VA: 
Defense Threat Reduction Agency, 2011), 7. 
15 Moltz, 33. 
16 Department of the Air Force, The Department of the Air Force Arctic Strategy. 
6 
thesis analyzes how an allied space policy for the Arctic region, with an associated 
implementation plan to address Arctic allied and partner civil, commercial, and defense 
space capabilities, would benefit United States strategic objectives within the Arctic. This 
thesis analyzes how the United States and its allies can leverage not only their significant 
defense relationships within the region, but also combine their respective civil, 
commercial, and multinational assets to mitigate Arctic strategic capability gaps and 
enhance space operations and associated capabilities in the region.  
Fortunately, the United States maintains a considerable network of allies and 
partners within and around the Arctic region. Of the eight Arctic States consisting of 
Canada, the Kingdom of Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, the Russian Federation, 
Sweden, and the United States,17 four are United States North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
(NATO) allies including Canada, the Kingdom of Denmark, Iceland, and Norway; and 
Finland and Sweden are NATO Enhanced Opportunities Partners.18 The criticality of this 
extensive defense network is highlighted in the 2019 DOD Arctic Strategy, stating, “[t]he 
network of U.S. allies and partners with shared national interests… is the United States’ 
greatest strategic advantage in the Arctic region, and thus the cornerstone of DOD’s Arctic 
strategy.”19 However, current Arctic strategies and strategic initiatives to bridge existing 
capability gaps are exacerbating an already complex problem by seeking national solutions 
that are consistently underinvested in rather than leveraging Arctic allies and partners 
within the region. In line with the 2018 DOD National Defense Strategy (NDS), the United 
 
17 Arctic states refer to those countries that are members of the Arctic Council: Canada, the Kingdom 
of Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Russia, Sweden, and the United States. 
18 Enhanced Opportunities Partner is a NATO partner program designed to strengthen interoperability 
between NATO partners and allies; Australia, Finland, Georgia, Jordan, Sweden, and Ukraine are enhanced 
partners as of May 2021. 
19 Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, Report to Congress: Department of Defense 
Arctic Strategy (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2019), 2, 
https://media.defense.gov/2019/Jun/06/20021 41657 /-1/-1/1/2019-DOD-ARCTIC-STRATEGY.PDF. 
7 
States’ extensive network of allies and partners within the Arctic provides “a durable, 
asymmetric strategic advantage that no competitor or rival” within the region can match.20  
Years of underinvestment in the Arctic since the end of the Cold War leaves the 
United States catching up to potential adversaries that are prioritizing the region due to its 
future geostrategic value. As United States regional influence diminishes, U.S. economic 
and national security interests in the Arctic are being threatened. Current U.S. space policy 
recognizes that global commitments must be balanced against limited national resources. 
The 2017 DOD International Space Cooperation Strategy emphasizes that the current 
operational environment “necessitates prioritizing international space cooperation 
activities to maximize mutually beneficial national security return on investment.”21 It 
goes on to say that growing threats to national security interests requires greater 
international engagement and cooperation to address space operations and associated 
capability gaps. Furthermore, the 2018 NDS emphasizes the value of alliances to the United 
States. It states, “our network of alliances and partnerships are the backbone of global 
security.”22 The commander of USNORTHCOM in a March 2020 report to the Senate 
Armed Services Committee on Arctic policy, reemphasized this position, stating, “Our 
network of allies and partners is the cornerstone of the Department’s approach to the Arctic 
region and represents a strategic advantage for the United States, which China and Russia 
do not possess.”23  
But why are Arctic allies and partners so important? And if space cooperation is so 
important, why has it been so difficult to achieve significant results? This thesis 
investigates how a comprehensive cooperative strategy to build space collaborative 
 
20 Department of Defense, Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy of the United States of 
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capacity is necessary to address Arctic strategic capability gaps and limitations. An 
important question that must be answered is not whether the United States should engage 
in space cooperation initiatives within the Arctic region, but rather, can the United States 
afford not to lead collaborative initiatives related to space considering its underfunded and 
disadvantaged position in the Arctic? 
C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
While there has been ample study of international cooperation and competition in 
space, there is relatively little research available on the challenges and opportunities related 
to regional space cooperation specific to the Arctic region. This is largely attributed to the 
relatively nascent or non-existent space programs of U.S. allies and partners within the 
region until recently. A key exception is the space cooperation between Canada and the 
United States with collaboration through both the National Aeronautics and Space 
Administration (NASA) and the defense sector. As the Arctic is a vital geostrategic region 
bounded by great powers, regional collective action in space has largely coincided with the 
escalation of American and Russian military presence within the region. Like the space 
domain, the Arctic strategic environment has been defined by great power competition. 
Today’s Arctic and space domain are no different, with a reemerging Russian military 
presence and rising Chinese economic investment drawing U.S. attention back to the 
Arctic. Surveying the literature written on U.S. space cooperation within the Arctic region 
since the beginning of the Cold War, there are two identifiable points of inflection that are 
largely dependent on the geopolitical reality of the time: Arctic nationalism beginning in 
the Cold War and characterized by space dominance culminating with General Secretary 
of the USSR, Mikhail Gorbachev’s “zone of peace” speech in 1987; and Arctic cooperative 
security characterized by space assurance and the current operating environment.24  
The period of Arctic nationalism throughout the Cold War witnessed the United 
States and the Soviet Union competing for space dominance and regional hegemony of the 
 
24 Gunhild Hoogensen Gjørv and Kara K. Hodgson, “‘Arctic Exceptionalism’ or Comprehensive 
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Arctic. Arctic nationalism was characterized by U.S. geopolitical dominance of the Arctic 
region through “the sound and rational development of the Arctic” and promoted essential 
U.S. security interests through mutually beneficial international cooperation.25 Le Mière 
and Mazo point out that, as “the shortest route between the Soviet Union and the continental 
United States for aircraft and ballistic missiles,”26 the Arctic region was a geostrategic 
buffer zone where space operations were critical for strategic air defense, missile defense 
and early-warning, multi-domain awareness, and C3ISR. U.S. space cooperation initiatives 
were largely focused on interorganizational collaboration between NATO allies that 
enhanced strategic nuclear deterrence through terrestrial and space-based sensors and 
provided for the protection of essential U.S. security interests in the Arctic. Two significant 
space collaboration initiatives were the building of the Distant Early Warning (DEW) Line 
and the establishment of North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD). The 
DEW Line consisted of a string of early-warning radar stations across the entire far north 
of the North American continent to include locations in the United States via Alaska’s 
Aleutian Islands, as well as NATO allies Canada, the Kingdom of Denmark (via the Faroe 
Islands and Greenland), and Iceland.27 Additionally, the historical bilateral cooperative 
agreement of the United States and Canada with the establishment of NORAD on 12 
September 1957 provided aerospace warning, aerospace control, and maritime warning in 
the defense of North America.28  
The competitive race for space dominance in the Arctic witnessed what Everett 
Dolman in his book Astropolitik described as the astropolitical policy of astrostrategy, or 
“the identification of critical terrestrial and outer space locations, the control of which can 
provide military and political dominance of outer space, or at a minimum can insure against 
 
25 U.S. National Security Council, National Security Decision Memorandum 144: United States Arctic 
Policy and Arctic Policy Group (Washington, DC: National Security Council, 1971), 1, 
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Routledge, 2013), 82. 
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the same dominance by a potential opponent state.”29 Although his work has been 
controversial since it was published in 2002, Dolman argues that the United States should 
seize control of outer space and become a watch dog to maintain space dominance and by 
extension global control.30 He characterized space as “the ultimate high ground” and 
theorized that the weaponization of space was inevitable as nations attempt to counter 
adversary advantages within the space domain.31 The Arctic and the polar region above it 
represent geostrategic and astrostrategic choke points. Due to the physics determining 
orbital mechanics, space objects in polar low-earth orbit (LEO) orbits must pass over the 
polar region.  
Similarly, as the shortest distance between great powers, the Arctic is a strategic 
avenue of approach. Dolman goes on to say that “control of these few geographically 
determined locations would guarantee dominance over global military movement and 
world trade to the overseeing state.”32 According to Joint Publication 3-14: Space 
Operations, dominance equates to the ability of the United States to project national power 
at a “time, place, manner, and domain” of its choosing.33 Consequently, Dolman advocated 
for the necessity of projecting national power and controlling strategically advantageous 
positions both terrestrially and in space to achieve strategic objectives. Like dominance of 
an area or key terrain both terrestrially and in space, control assures the use of the domain 
through deterrence and the application of national power to achieve strategic objectives.34 
Although controversial, his words have proven to be prophetic as polar great power 
competition sees the race for Arctic and space dominance continue today.  
 
29 Everett C. Dolman, Astropolitik: Classical Geopolitics in the Space Age (New York: Frank Cass 
Publishers, 2002), 15.  
30 Dolman, 157. 
31 Dolman, 151. 
32 Dolman, 34. 
33 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Space Operations, JP 3-14 (Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2020), vii, 
https://fas.org/irp/doddir/dod/jp3_14.pdf. 
34 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Space Operations, JP 3-14, II-2.  
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However, critics would argue that Dolman’s work lacked a “comprehensive theory 
of space power, as its argument only resonates in the United States and lacks the 
universalism that marks all great works of strategic theory.”35 Jonathan Havercroft and 
Raymond Duvall’s article “Critical Astropolitics: The Geopolitics of Space Control and 
the Transformation of State Sovereignty” asserts that Dolman’s theories emphasized too 
strongly a “preference for competition over collaboration in both the economic and military 
spheres” of influence.36 Furthermore, Johnson-Freese and Smith argue that the pursuit of 
space dominance stems largely from fear and self-interest and that “prudence regarding 
military readiness with an equal amount of active, preventive diplomatic efforts” provides 
a stronger strategic deterrent.37 Although the Arctic witnessed space policies and practices 
largely emphasizing geostrategic control through surveillance and power projection during 
the Cold War, there were multiple examples of space collaboration between both United 
States allies and partners as well as between the United States and the Soviet Union. The 
Arctic “maintained a ‘negative peace’ whereby the region was a buffer zone between the 
superpowers during the Cold War.”38  
The Obama administration’s 2010 National Space Policy (NSP) renewed U.S. 
initiatives to strengthen international collaboration in space. The policy emphasized the 
need to “expand international cooperation on mutually beneficial space activities to: 
broaden and extend the benefits of space; further the peaceful use of space; and enhance 
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collection and partnership in sharing of space-derived information.”39 In contrast to the 
Bush administration’s 2006 NSP, the Obama administration sought “bilateral and 
multilateral transparency and confidence-building measures to develop equitable and 
verifiable international agreements to improve space security.”40 It further stipulated that 
the civil, commercial, and defense interagency must identify areas for international 
cooperation to promote costs and risk-sharing agreements with participating nations that 
“augment U.S. capabilities by leveraging existing and planned space capabilities of allies 
and space partners.”41  
The Obama administration sought to reorient national space policy objectives away 
from a nationalistic competitive approach to space, and instead “adopted an informal, 
consensus-building strategy” that “emphasized international outreach and the need to 
develop common norms to promote safe and responsible space operations.”42 
Additionally, the NSP provided national security space guidance to the Secretary of 
Defense and the Director of National Intelligence to develop, maintain, and integrate space 
operations and associated capabilities to improve operational efficiencies across the 
various departments and agencies within the DOD and intelligence community (IC).43 The 
Obama administration recognized the growing threats of a resurgent Russia and a rising 
China, and emphasized the need for collective action to promote security and stability 
utilizing United States allies and leveraging the emerging commercial space sector to 
achieve the “responsible and peaceful use of space.”44 The subsequent 2011 National 
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Security Space Strategy (NSSS) laid the framework for the United States to “address the 
growing challenges of the congested, contested, and competitive space environment while 
continuing [United States] leadership in the space domain.”45  
Similarly, the 2018 National Defense Strategy argues that the United States is 
“emerging from a period of strategic atrophy, aware that our competitive military 
advantage has been eroding.”46 The United States’ choice to act as a “reluctant Arctic 
power” and withdraw in the post-Cold War period, caused space capabilities within the 
region to atrophy and geopolitical influence amongst key allies to degrade. Furthermore, 
rapid change and increasing human activity demands greater capability with increased 
capacity during a time when the United States has neglected its Arctic commitments. 
Dolman would prophesize, “The lack of an enemy in space is most assuredly causing 
complacency in the United States, stunting expansion of its space capabilities, and further 
causing our allies to develop their own potentially conflicting military space capacities 
because they cannot be sure of U.S. commitments in the future.”47 Steven Lambakis 
supports the need for allied space structures to address this capability gap stating, “The 
United States will need the political support of its allies and friends as well as their 
involvement in military space activities, to include economic contribution through 
collaboration in system development and participation in operations.”48 He goes on to say 
that “There are ground elements, and surveillance activities that are critical to all military 
space missions, and there are undoubtedly several contributions U.S. allies can make in 
these areas.”49  
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As previously mentioned, U.S. capability gaps have largely gone unresolved for 
several decades. A recent Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) report 
attributes U.S. stagnation in Arctic development on a failure of U.S. policymakers to 
understand the strategic implications of emerging polar great power competition in the 
Arctic. The report argues that, “While the United States believes the Arctic will remain of 
limited strategic value and that its current minimalist posture is sufficient, its two near-peer 
competitors, Russia and China, have taken dramatically different and long-term views of 
the region and have expanded their military and economic footprints.”50 It goes on to say 
that “Despite over a decade of studies and assessments, the [United States] continues to 
rely on outdated capabilities and thinly resourced budgets.” U.S. Arctic policy and 
implementation strategies are largely descriptive in nature and although they identify lines 
of effort and associated priorities, they continue to fail to alter resources or establish 
permanent organizational structure that will advance national geostrategic interests in the 
Arctic region. 
However, the challenges to build space collaborative capacity in the Arctic are 
immense. Nascent and emerging space programs within the Nordic countries have 
constrained budgets, U.S. strategic priorities lie elsewhere in the South China Sea, and 
Canada’s primary Arctic-focus is on maritime security with modest investment 
elsewhere.51 Gunhild Gjørv in his work on understanding security in the Arctic argues that 
a comprehensive security approach must be taken within the Arctic that “neither rejects 
processes of cooperation, nor denies areas of tension that foster increased perceptions of 
insecurity. Instead, it provides an analytical tool that exposes the way in which security 
narratives in the region are complementary, or in competition, at a given time.”52 
Additionally, Isaiah Honable in his research on space theories, concludes, “for a unified 
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space theory to be broadly applicable, it must encompass space capabilities as they relate 
to all the aspects of national power.”53 The same can be said for a comprehensive space 
cooperative strategy within the Arctic inclusive of Arctic allies and partners within the 
region. 
D. POTENTIAL EXPLANATIONS AND HYPOTHESES 
Recognizing the need for change and seeking to transform space capabilities within 
the Arctic is a challenging task made even more difficult by finite budgets and competing 
global fiscal and operational commitments. Gjørv and Hodgson’s research points out that 
the post-Cold War era introduced the security concept of Arctic exceptionalism, which 
characterized the region as “detached from global political dynamics” and distinguished 
the Arctic as “an apolitical space of regional governance, functional cooperation, and 
peaceful co-existence.”54 However, the past decade of Arctic national policies and DOD 
Arctic strategies reflects a renewed assessment of the evolving Arctic security and 
economic environments. In a 2017 brief to Congress, General Joseph Dunford, chairman 
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, sounded the alarm by stating, “In just a few years, if we do not 
change the trajectory, we will lose our qualitative and quantitative competitive 
advantage.”55 Subsequently, updated strategies reflect the evolving United States strategic 
interests in the Arctic in an era of polar great power competition.  
The compelling need to transform strategic capabilities provides the catalyst to 
address capability gaps and develop innovative proposals which are strategically 
responsive, feasible, and achievable. As identified by NPS author and defense strategist, 
Dr. Scott Jasper, “Transformation, irrespective of the level it occurs at, can be carried out 
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only if it is understood and accepted in terms of necessity.”56 Emerging national space 
collaborative concepts as well as the recently published 2020 NSP recognize the necessity 
of space cooperation and have called for the preservation and expansion of U.S. leadership 
in space with likeminded international partners.57 A review of literature related to policies 
and capability needs within the Arctic and space reveals three potential explanations for 
how the United States can build space collaborative capacity and benefit from space 
cooperation in the Arctic.  
First, it can be credibly hypothesized that the Arctic will continue to be a region of 
cooperation among U.S. allies and partners, with the space domain loosely benefiting from 
established cooperative norms within the region. It can be argued that this would see a 
continuation of limited bilateral cooperation amongst the United States and certain allies 
and partners within the Arctic. Although this could be characterized as a continuation of 
the status quo, the Trump administration’s “America First” approach to international 
relations demonstrates that continued U.S. engagement with allies is no foregone 
conclusion. Michael Byers concludes in his work on international cooperation in the Arctic 
and space that “the more states need to cooperate in a particular region or issue-area, and 
the more they become accustomed to doing so, the more resilient that cooperation will 
become.”58 He terms this phenomenon: “complex and resilient interdependence.”59 Byers 
argues that the remote and extreme operating environments of both the Arctic and space as 
well as the required interaction of states to overcome region or domain specific challenges 
necessitates cooperation. He specifically, “compares Russian-Western cooperation in the 
Arctic and space with a focus on why cooperation continued after the 2014 annexation of 
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Crimea.”60 Although Byers’ comparative approach focused on cooperative factors 
between Russia and principally the United States in space and the Arctic during that time, 
his conclusions on why the Arctic and space create opportunities for cooperation contribute 
to this thesis’ main question of how to build space collaborative capacity amongst U.S. 
allies and partners within the region.  
A review of U.S. space initiatives in the Arctic points to not only an internal 
balancing of resources to mitigate capability gaps within the region, but external balancing 
with Arctic allies and partners. As an example, the United States and Canada are 
collaborating on the Enhanced Satellite Communications Project - Polar, and the United 
States is leveraging Norway to modernize the Enhanced Polar System Recapitalization 
project.61 Both of these programs are bilateral collaborative efforts to mitigate Arctic 
communications gaps that also address U.S. strategic capability shortfalls within the 
region. Although these are only two projects of many currently being worked on by the 
United States and its Arctic allies and partners, current initiatives would appear to validate 
the initial hypothesis that the Arctic presents an opportunity as a zone of cooperation in 
space. Although this hypothesis remains credible, the growing tensions in the Arctic will 
likely require a more robust and focused response from the United States to encourage 
greater regional space collaborative efforts to address Arctic specific concerns.  
Second, it can be argued that longstanding Arctic intergovernmental forums 
provide the structure necessary to stimulate regional space cooperation and support 
collaborative efforts through resource investment in shared regional objectives through 
multilateral cooperation. As previously discussed, collective action is principally driven by 
shared grievances and the felt need to collaborate to achieve national interests. The need 
for collaboration is important, but equally important is the organizational structure to create 
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lasting results. Fortunately, the United States enjoys significant political, economic, and 
defense relationships within the region in well-established organizational structures to 
facilitate cooperative agreements. The Arctic region has a significant number of established 
intergovernmental forums to include NATO, the European Union, the European Space 
Agency, the Nordic Council, and NORAD among others. Moltz, in his article “Coalition 
Building in Space: Where Networks are Power,” advocates for an “allied space network as 
a possible means of both reducing risks and enhancing space power.”62 He goes on to say 
that “trans-national networks and alliances offer considerable untapped potential, with 
possibly significant benefits particularly for the United States, which – unlike China and 
Russia – already has established military alliances with a number of countries possessing 
or now developing advanced space capabilities.”63 A comprehensive transnational Arctic 
network consisting of allies and partners would leverage existing intergovernmental 
structure within the Arctic and potentially provide a more robust response to mitigating 
U.S. strategic capability gaps within the region.  
Third, it can be hypothesized that a more robust Arctic cooperative space strategy 
will fail to materialize due to a combination of regional specific challenges, such as 
nationalism, lack of dedicated resources, conflicting political goals, and a lack of sustained 
political leadership to implement long term results. Although the United States, and the 
DOD specifically, has acknowledged the need to build collaborative space capacity in the 
Arctic, there are significant challenges to overcome in the implementation of a 
collaborative comprehensive allied space concept. The recent Trump administration called 
for expanding international cooperation in space and the Arctic through multilateral 
forums.64 However, the administration’s insistence on challenging multilateral partners 
and demands for increased alliance spending reflected an American nationalistic approach 
that damaged U.S. alliances. In his study on international cooperation in space, Cody 
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Knipfer highlights key challenges in space collective action noting that “countries are 
inherently self-interested; their activity in and use of space serves a distinct goal—political, 
economic, scientific, or national security—that brings them benefit, international 
competitive advantage, and justifies the costs and complexities involved in a space 
program.”65 Problems in space collective action largely stems from nationalism, lack of 
resources due to cost; programmatic stability and political consistency; a reluctance to 
transfer sensitive or proprietary information; a mistrust based on competition over interests; 
and an unwillingness of allies and partners to address space security concerns. These 
factors and others are addressed in greater detail in chapter three of this thesis. 
E. RESEARCH DESIGN 
This thesis investigates current U.S. strategic capability gaps and evaluates the 
necessity of space operations and associated capabilities to mitigate regional resource 
shortfalls and meet U.S. Arctic-related strategic objectives. Research will primarily consist 
of open source, qualitative analysis of allied and partner national policies, military strategic 
documents, commercial projects, and civil space cooperation initiatives; however, 
quantitative open-source figures to include budgets, launch statistics, and ongoing space 
unclassified programs are incorporated throughout the analysis. Additionally, a review of 
literature related to the geostrategic importance of the Arctic and a brief history of U.S. 
national space and Arctic policies provides the strategic context for the desirability of space 
operations to address Arctic technical and geopolitical challenges. Reviewed materials 
referenced throughout the analysis primarily consist of academic journals, research papers, 
and books from academic publishers as well as web-based sources to include reliable news 
sources, government sites, government and academic policy centers, and official 
government publications. 
This thesis analyzes space cooperation opportunities and challenges with the goal 
of offering a comprehensive overview of the nascent and established allied and partner 
Arctic space programs, their current national trajectories, and their political, economic, and 
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defense motivations in building space collaborative capacity within the Arctic.66 To 
qualitatively evaluate the potential to build collaborative capacity within the Arctic, this 
thesis leverages an interorganizational collaborative capacity (ICC) model to evaluate ICC 
through five design factors of purpose and strategy, lateral mechanisms, people, structure, 
and incentive and reward systems.67 The ICC model provides a framework to analyze 
interorganizational collaboration behavior and determines factors that influence countries 
to “enter, develop, and sustain interorganizational systems in pursuit of collective 
outcomes.”68 Furthermore, within this thesis, rationales for partnering in allied space 
activities are explored and common barriers to allied and partner space collaborative 
actions are identified.  
This thesis utilizes comparative case studies to determine how allies and partners 
in the region could help ensure adequate C3ISR and communications coverage to 
maximize domain awareness and build collaborative space capacity within the Arctic. 
Additionally, this thesis investigates the current state of allied and partner space 
capabilities, explores motivations and key trends of the respective space programs, and 
provides a qualitative assessment of each country’s space capabilities that could contribute 
to building space collaborative capacity within the region. Given their comparatively 
advanced role in terms of technology, longevity, and economic investment, this thesis 
mainly references the space programs of Canada, Denmark, Norway, and Sweden, but it 
will also discuss the nascent space activities of Finland and Iceland and their potential 
contributions to Arctic space cooperation.  
The aim of this thesis is not to provide a definitive operational history of each of 
these countries in space, but rather to explore the motivations and key trends of their 
respective space programs and, specifically, to identify areas in which the United States 
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could build space collaborative capacity through space and security related benefits. The 
policy recommendations at the conclusion are intended to inform the State Department, the 
DOD, Homeland Security, and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence to form 
the basis of a new, competitive, and realistic U.S. comprehensive space strategy for the 
Arctic. The gap this thesis seeks to fill is to provide original analysis covering the 
comparative motivations for space activity among Arctic countries within the regional 
context and how the United States could benefit from a space cooperation strategy within 
the region to achieve strategic objectives.69 
F. THESIS OVERVIEW 
This thesis is organized into five chapters that seek to analyze how the United States 
could build allied and partner space collaborative capacity within the Arctic region. The 
thesis guides the reader through the possible need for space collaborative capacity within 
the Arctic, the challenges of space collaborative action within the region, and opportunities 
for cooperation with allies and partners through bilateral, multilateral, and 
intergovernmental cooperative space initiatives. The first chapter introduced the 
importance of space operations and associated capabilities to mitigate U.S. strategic 
capability gaps within the Arctic, presented the major research question, provided its 
significance, reviewed relevant literature related to U.S. space cooperation as it pertains to 
the Arctic region, and suggested three different competing hypotheses that seek to answer 
the research question.  
The second through fourth chapters provide the reader an understanding of the 
opportunities and challenges of cooperative space initiatives within the Arctic region. The 
second chapter highlights the geostrategic importance of the Arctic to U.S. national 
security interests and emphasizes the need for urgency to address current U.S. strategic 
capability gaps within the region. The third chapter explores the possible rationales and 
presents challenges for building space collective action within the Arctic region. The fourth 
chapter provides a comparative case study of existing allied and partner space capabilities 
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within the Arctic region. Economic, military, and political motivations for space activity is 
assessed, and brief histories of military and scientific activity in the space domain is 
addressed. This thesis examines the space collaborative capacity of two spacefaring U.S. 
allies within the Arctic: Denmark and Norway. These case studies assess the potential for 
bilateral and regional space collective action within the Arctic and the possible benefits to 
the United States. Each is analyzed through three parts, identified by a brief history of space 
activity, motivations and key trends of Arctic space programs, and areas of cooperation for 
building space collaborative capacity in the Arctic within the future. Additionally, NATO 
and the Arctic is addressed as an avenue to building intergovernmental space collaboration. 
The final chapter summarizes the research and analyzes the geopolitical reality of 
current Arctic space programs and the opportunities and challenges of building U.S. allied 
and partner space collaborative capacity within the Arctic. Additionally, the proposed 
hypotheses for answering the major research question are revisited and evaluated based on 
gathered quantitative and qualitative data. Furthermore, areas for enhanced cooperation are 
identified based on shared political objectives, historic areas of collaboration, and political 
will as expressed by current space strategies and policies of allies and partners within the 
region. This thesis investigates how the United States might benefit from a cooperative 
space strategy for the Arctic and whether the United States would benefit from building 
collaborative space capacity within the Arctic to mitigate its strategic capability gaps. The 
thesis suggests that the United States should build space collaborative capacity within the 
Arctic through an implementation plan that considers the regional challenges of space 
cooperation in the Arctic, leverages the strength of cooperative relationships within the 
region, and advocates for a transnational network of allies and partners through the existing 
network of intergovernmental forums. The rationale developed in this thesis to research, 
analyze, and evaluate allied and partner space collaborative capacity within the Arctic 
could be applied to other regions to help expand and enhance partnerships in the space 
domain. 
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II. BUILDING SPACE COLLABORATIVE CAPACITY  
This chapter on the geostrategic importance of the Arctic to U.S. national security 
interests has four parts. The chapter provides an overview of U.S. Arctic policy and 
national security interests as they relate to the space domain and provides the strategic 
context to the rapidly changing geostrategic conditions in the region. Additionally, the 
chapter investigates the space collaborative capacity of the United States to develop and 
sustain bilateral, multilateral, and intergovernmental space cooperative security through a 
comprehensive cooperative capabilities-based assessment of the current Arctic operational 
environment.  
The first part describes the Arctic as a geostrategic environment and discusses the 
dynamic and challenging operational environment that the United States must overcome to 
assert its influence within the region. The second part introduces the complexity of the 
increasing political and geostrategic value of the Arctic as an arena for polar great power 
competition and homeland defense. The third part provides a brief history of U.S. Arctic 
policies that emphasizes the strategic context for the desirability of space operations to 
address Arctic technical and geopolitical challenges. The fourth part discusses space 
collaborative capacity within the Arctic through a review of identified national interests, 
established policies, and mechanisms for space-based cooperative behavior. A review of 
recent U.S. space and Arctic policies provides a strategic framework in which to analyze 
space collaborative capacity as it relates to current U.S. strategy and political rhetoric. 
Finally, the last part analyzes the preceding five parts to assess the need for the United 
States to address strategic capability gaps through the geostrategic context of polar great 
power competition.  
A. THE ARCTIC AS A GEOSTRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT 
The United States has largely recognized the geostrategic importance of the Arctic 
since becoming an Arctic State with the 1867 acquisition of Alaska. Although the purchase 
of Alaska was initially ridiculed as a $7.2 million “polar bear garden,” the U.S. acquisition 
from Russia has come to be seen as a geopolitical achievement providing the United States 
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a “forward position in the Pacific, a vital source of domestic oil and gas, and a point of 
access to the Arctic Ocean.”70 As early as 1935 in a speech to Congress, Brigadier General 
Billy Mitchell, whom many consider to be the father of the U.S. Air Force, insisted that, 
“whoever holds Alaska will hold the world. I think it is the most important strategic place 
in the world.”71 This perspective continues today as codified in the U.S. Department of the 
Air Force’s 2020 Arctic Strategy when it emphasizes that, “The Arctic is a region of 
immense geostrategic significance and a key location for global power projection.”72 
These assertions reinforce Dolman’s claim that the Arctic and polar space domain above it 
represent not only a geostrategic arena for competition, but an astrostrategic choke point 
for future exploitation, expansion, and influence.73 
The Arctic is primarily a maritime domain with large swaths of its landmass 
inhospitable to large population centers.74 Consequently, U.S. efforts within the Arctic 
region are largely concentrated on enabling U.S. interests in the maritime domain or the air 
and space above it. As the smallest of the world’s great oceans, the Arctic Ocean is 
constrained by three strategic maritime corridors that have significant U.S. allied and 
partner presence, with Japan, South Korea, and Canada near the Bering Strait; Canada and 
Denmark via Greenland near the Davis Strait; and the Greenland, Iceland, United Kingdom 
(UK) – Norway (GIUK-N) Gap consisting entirely of U.S. NATO allies. Although Russia 
is the largest Arctic state by both population and size of its coastline, it is constrained by 
U.S. allies and partners along its Arctic maritime corridor. As identified in the U.S. Navy’s 
2019 Strategic Outlook for the Arctic, “The [Bering] Strait has strategic significance since 
it enables Russia to connect its Asian and European naval forces. As the Pacific gateway 
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for the Northern Sea Route and the Trans-Polar Route, the Bering Strait may become more 
important for seaborne trade between Europe and Asia.” Likewise, the GIUK-N Gap 
provides “a strategic corridor for naval operations in the high north…[and] serves as the 
Atlantic terminus for the Trans-Polar Route, which may become a viable economic option 
to ship goods from the Pacific to the Atlantic markets.”75 Space operations and associated 
capabilities provide the means to enable and support maritime operations through space-
based C3ISR and enhanced multi-domain awareness to include weather, communications, 
and ice coverage reports. Maintaining the security and international freedom of the seas 
within these strategic corridors is crucial for the United States to maintain peace and 
stability within the region and pressure potential adversaries to comply with the rules-based 
international order.  
But the Arctic is undergoing dramatic change. The region is heating up as surface 
air temperatures rise twice as fast as the rest of the Earth. Additionally, reducing sea ice 
coverage is opening more efficient sea lines of communication with increased commercial, 
military, and tourism-related shipping across the region. Current estimates project that 
major sea lanes will be accessible twelve months of the year by 2040 and that the North 
Pole will be ice free by 2050.76 These major sea lines of communication could reduce 
shipping times between Europe and Asia by as much as two to three weeks or greater 
depending on the transpolar route.77 This changing physical environment is presenting 
economic opportunities while also highlighting U.S. strategic capability gaps as 
competition grows for Arctic economic and geopolitical influence.  
Furthermore, estimated vast untapped natural resources have the potential to 
transform the Arctic into an area of increased human activity with significant geopolitical 
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and security implications. The Arctic is a region with significant natural resources. A 2008 
U.S. Geological Survey (USGS) estimated that “90 billion barrels of oil, 1,669 trillion 
cubic feet of natural gas, and 44 billion barrels of natural gas liquids” may remain to be 
discovered in the Arctic.78 A 2012 U.S. Energy Information Administration report 
estimated that these figures would account for 13% of the world’s undiscovered 
conventional oil resources and 30% of the world’s undiscovered conventional natural gas 
reserves.79 Moreover, the Prudhoe Bay Oil Field on Alaska’s North Slope possesses North 
America’s largest oil field, containing approximately 25 billion barrels of oil. Furthermore, 
it is estimated that close to 50% of U.S. fish stocks come from the 200 nautical mile 
exclusive economic zone (EEZ) off the coast of Alaska with an average wholesale value 
of nearly 4.5 billion dollars a year.80 Consequently, the United States has substantial 
geopolitical, national security, economic, environmental, and energy strategic objectives 
amongst other interests in the region. 
However, as previously mentioned, despite the significant geostrategic and 
economic value the region presents, U.S. policymakers have consistently underinvested in 
infrastructure, capabilities, and diplomatic initiatives to address the strategic capability 
gaps within the region. Fortunately, the Arctic is becoming accessible at a time when U.S. 
allies and partner’s civil, military, and commercial space industries have developed to a 
point where cooperative space-based solutions could be implemented. As highlighted in 
Karen Jones’ Aerospace article on “Closing the Arctic Infrastructure Gap,” space-based 
solutions “can support Arctic stakeholders needs for faster and ubiquitous 
communications, timely domain awareness, and an improved means to accurately navigate 
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and observe the region’s rapidly changing conditions.”81 She goes on to say, “For remote 
Arctic regions, space systems provide critical infrastructure, which supports long-term 
national security, civil, environmental, and economic goals.”82 These space-based 
solutions provide the medium to address U.S. strategic capability gaps within the region, 
but the United States must weigh investment in the Arctic against competing global 
requirements in an era of great power competition. 
B. POLAR GREAT POWER COMPETITION 
The renewal of polar great power competition with the changing Arctic geopolitical 
and security environment is once again concentrating U.S. national security interests on a 
region traditionally viewed as an area of cooperation and low-tension. Professor Anne-
Marie Brady, a Chinese politics, polar politics, and foreign policy expert from the 
University of Canterbury in New Zealand, characterized polar great powers, in her book 
China as a Polar Great Power, as “states that exhibit ‘global structural power,’ or the 
ability to shape governance frameworks in the economic, military, and political-diplomatic 
sectors.”83 She goes on to state that, “to be considered a polar great power, a state must 
have high levels of polar scientific capacity and scientific research funding; a significant 
level of presence in the [Arctic]; and significant economic, military, political, and 
diplomatic capacity there; as well as a high level of international engagement in polar 
governance.”84 The emerging political and geostrategic threat to U.S. interests in the Arctic 
by an expanding and modernized Russian military presence and rising Chinese economic 
and scientific influence is seeing the Arctic region become a geostrategic flash point for 
future polar great power competition, where Russia, China, and the United States vie for 
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political and geostrategic influence in a region that has the potential to alter the rules-based 
international order.  
A revisionist Russia with a resurgent Arctic presence presents a dynamic security 
challenge across multiple Geographic Combatant Commands (GCC) that is complex, all-
domain, and multi-functional.85 The 2019 DOD Arctic Strategy notes that, “Russia views 
itself as a polar great power and is the largest Arctic nation by landmass, population, and 
military presence above the Arctic Circle.”86 The Russian Arctic coastline accounts for 
approximately 53 percent of the Arctic Ocean coastline, and Russia’s Arctic population of 
approximately two million people accounts for about half of the population living in the 
Arctic worldwide. Additionally, among the five Arctic littoral states of Canada, Denmark, 
Norway, Russia, and the United States, Russia possesses more than half of all the Arctic’s 
estimated oil and gas resources.87  
Recent Russian military reinvestment in the region has witnessed Russian heavy 
bombers conducting regular air patrols along the coastlines of countries within the region, 
and U.S. fighter aircraft routinely intercepting Russian military aircraft inside U.S. and 
Canadian Air Defense Identification Zones. Advanced air and sea-launched long-range 
precision-strike cruise missiles are being deployed within the region allowing greater 
standoff ranges well outside of U.S. radar coverage. Additionally, Russia has deployed the 
Severodvinsk-class guided missile submarine within the region, armed with low radar cross 
section land-attack cruise missiles.88  These military capabilities are reinforced by Russia 
“refurbishing Cold War-era bases, setting up new units, opening ports and runways, and 
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deploying radar and air-defense systems. In all, Russia has built 475 military facilities in 
the Arctic over the past six years [since 2019].”89 Additionally, Russia is aggressively 
challenging Arctic maritime security through the enforcement of aggressive economic 
coercion along the NSR counter to international laws. These advances in its Arctic military 
defense significantly increase Russia’s ability to defend and control a large stretch of the 
NSR and have the potential for Russia to claim an expanded EEZ that will disrupt the 
regional balance of power and international economic system.90  
A rising China in the region is both an opportunity and challenge for the United 
States and its partners within the Arctic. In a January 2018 white paper titled “China’s 
Arctic Policy,” China declared itself a “near-Arctic state” and presented its “Polar Silk 
Road” economic plan to facilitate economic and social development of the Arctic. The plan 
emphasized China’s strategic interests within the Arctic and proposed a comprehensive 
strategy “to understand, protect, develop, and participate in the governance of the 
Arctic.”91 Although China is not an Arctic state, China was granted Arctic “observer 
status” within the Arctic Council in 2013.92 As an observer state, China agreed to recognize 
the eight Arctic states’ sovereignty, sovereign rights, and jurisdiction in the Arctic.  
However, China has also identified the Arctic as an area of “undetermined 
sovereignty” in which it can assert its political and economic power to influence the 
regional governance structure. Chinese economic, military, political, and diplomatic 
influence within the Arctic region provides China strategic access to transpolar shipping 
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routes between Asia and Europe that reduce China’s dependence on southern sea routes 
that transit regions of U.S. influence and maritime control. China’s geostrategic priorities 
within the Arctic are focused on security, economic resources, and strategic science.93 In 
regard to space above the Arctic, Chinese space-related Arctic research focuses on research 
and development in the earth’s magnetic field, the aurora, all domain awareness, strategic 
early warning, and space situational awareness (SSA) capabilities to extend China’s 
operational reach.94 Space analysts have noted that China may seek to improve its SSA 
capabilities to better identify on-orbit targets and provide accurate engagement criteria to 
support space defense and counter-orbiting systems.95 China’s President Xi Jinping 
clarified Chinese interest in the Arctic contending that, “Polar affairs have a unique role in 
our marine development strategy, and the process of becoming a polar power is an 
important component of China’s process to become maritime great power.”96  
Chinese polar interests are further illustrated in China’s vertical world map that 
places China at the center of the world with the polar regions dominating to the north and 
south. The Chinese world view sees itself visually dominating the Asia-Pacific, while 
sidelining the U.S., and dwarfing the importance of Europe.97 Additionally, in 2015, “the 
Chinese government announced that the polar regions, the deep seabed, and outer space 
are China’s ‘new strategic frontiers’ (zhanlüe xin jiangu), strategically important areas 
from which China will draw the resources needed to become a global power.”98 This 
increased Chinese interest in the Arctic has witnessed China investing more money in 
 
93 Brady, China as a Polar Great Power, 7. 
94 Brady, 10. 
95 Bhavya Lal, Asha Balakrishnan, Becaja M. Caldwell, Reina S. Buenconsejo, and Sara A. Carioscia, 
“Global Trends in Space Situational Awareness (SSA) and Space Traffic Management (STM)” for the 
Institute of Defense Analysis, Science & Technology Policy Institute (Washington, DC: IDA Science & 
Technology Policy Institute, 2018), 22, https://www.ida.org/-/media/feature/publications/g/gl/global-
trends-in-space-situational-awareness-ssa-and-space-traffic-management-stm/d-9074.ashx. 
96 Brady, China as a Polar Great Power, 3.  
97 Brady, 5.  
98 Brady, 7. 
31 
capacity than any other nation within the Arctic region,99 with significant economic 
investments in Canada, Denmark via Greenland, Iceland, and Norway, and significant 
investments in Russia’s Arctic oil and gas industry, ports, and infrastructure such as hotels.  
As the global balance of power shifts from the unipolarity of U.S. dominance to a 
multipolar world with great power competition amongst Russia, China, and the United 
States, American Arctic influence is viewed to be declining as China is increasingly 
challenging U.S. hegemony across the globe.100 A recent poll by the European Council on 
Foreign Relations estimated that approximately 52 percent of Swedish respondents and 48 
percent of Danish respondents thought in ten years’ time, China would be a stronger power 
than the United States compared to 29 and 34 percent respectively who thought the United 
States would maintain its advantage. Moreover, key European allies Great Britain, 
Germany, and France had even higher percentages of their populations that believed China 
would overtake the United States with 58, 56, and 62 percent compared to 19, 24, and 18 
percent respectively that believed the United States would maintain its advantage.101 This 
eroding perception of U.S. prestige amongst key European allies and partners must be 
addressed by the U.S. if it seeks to maintain its regional dominance in Arctic affairs. 
C. BACKGROUND OF U.S. ARCTIC POLICY 
The U.S. government has articulated national Arctic policies since the 1970s with 
the Arctic acting as a geostrategic buffer zone during the Cold War between the Soviet 
Union and the United States. The Arctic played an important role during the Cold War in 
the defense of North America as a theatre for strategic air defense, early warning and 
missile defense, and a strategic maritime corridor for undersea submarine power 
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projection.102 Since the Nixon administration’s National Security Decision Memorandum 
144 (NSDM-144) in 1971, the United States has supported “the sound and rational 
development of the Arctic.” Guiding principles shaping U.S. Arctic policy identified 
environmental protection and scientific exploration, the promotion of international 
cooperation within the region, and the preservation of national security and economic 
interests in the Arctic as the overarching policy framework to achieve U.S. geostrategic 
interests.103  
The Arctic Research and Policy Act (ARPA) of 1984 under the Reagan 
administration further codified U.S. national interests within the region to “provide for a 
comprehensive national policy dealing with national research needs and objectives in the 
Arctic,” and identified the Arctic as a strategic source of energy and renewable resources. 
Additionally, the Reagan administration emphasized the geostrategic significance of the 
region by labeling the Arctic as critical to national defense and one of the Nation’s greatest 
commercial assets.104 This agreement would also formally define U.S. recognized 
geographic boundaries of the Arctic region. 
The post-Cold War era of Arctic exceptionalism brought geopolitical stability and 
constructive collaboration amongst the Arctic nations with the signing of the 1991 Arctic 
Environmental Protection Strategy (AEPS), which established an Arctic Monitoring and 
Assessment Program to monitor levels of pollutants and protect the marine environment in 
the Arctic.105 Although the AEPS wasn’t a binding treaty, it was seen as a monumental 
collaborative agreement amongst the Arctic nations, and was the precursor to the 1996 
Ottawa Declaration, which established the Arctic Council as “the preeminent 
 
102 Le Mière and Mazo, Arctic Opening: Insecurity and Opportunity, 82. 
103 U.S. National Security Council, National Security Decision Memorandum 144: United States 
Arctic Policy and Arctic Policy Group, 1. 
104 U.S. National Science Foundation, “Public Law 98-373. Arctic Research and Policy Act of 1984 
(amended 1990),” 31 July 1984, https://www.nsf.gov/geo/opp/arctic/iarpc/arc_res_pol_act.jsp. 
105 1st Arctic Ministerial Conference, Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy (Rovaniemi, Finland: 
1st Arctic Ministerial Conference, 1991), 2, http://library.arcticportal.org/1542/1/artic_environment.pdf. 
33 
intergovernmental forum for addressing issues related to the Arctic region.”106 The 
members of the Arctic Council include the eight Arctic states of Canada, Denmark, 
Finland, Iceland, Norway, Sweden, the Russian Federation, and the United States, as well 
as representation from Arctic permanent participant indigenous groups and Arctic 
Observer States.107 Although the establishment of the Arctic Council was consequential 
to developing an Arctic regional identity within international politics,108 this era would see 
the United States as a “reluctant Arctic power,” with U.S. national attention elsewhere 
around the world and U.S. unipolarity guaranteed as the nation enjoyed a period of military, 
economic, and technological superiority over the rest of the world.  
However, in 2007, Russia reinvigorated U.S. national security interest in the Arctic 
by planting a Russian flag on the seabed of the North Pole, indicating to the international 
community its attempted claim of oil and gas reserves worth billions of dollars along the 
Lomonosov Ridge in the middle of the Arctic Ocean.109 This symbolic gesture reinforced 
to the world Russia’s inherent Arctic interests and foreshadowed Russia’s reemergence as 
an active regional power. In response, the Bush administration signed the 2009 National 
Security Presidential Directive (NSPD) 66, which largely established the current U.S. 
framework related to the Arctic and specified the broad national security interests in the 
Arctic region to include: “missile defense and early warning; deployment of sea and air 
systems for strategic sealift, strategic deterrence, maritime presence, and maritime security 
operations; and ensuring freedom of navigation and overflight.”110  
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The Bush administration’s Arctic policy directive designated freedom of the seas 
as a top national priority and emphasized the contrasting geopolitical circumstances of the 
Arctic and Antarctic region. Furthermore, it codified the U.S diplomatic stance that the 
Northwest Passage within Canada’s EEZ and the Northern Sea Route (NSR) within 
Russia’s EEZ are straits used for international navigation and that international law applies 
to passage through those straits.111 This provided a clear U.S. stance on freedom of 
navigation enforcement within the Arctic and reinforced the U.S.’s desire to ensure 
maritime passages were secured for global trade.  
This policy directive presented the most robust U.S. Arctic policy framework of 
any previous administration and demonstrated to the international community the U.S.’s 
stance that environmental protection and international cooperation in the Arctic should be 
prioritized, but also established that the United States was “prepared to operate either 
independently or in conjunction with other states to safeguard” U.S. strategic interests in 
the region.112 Critically, the policy also highlighted key U.S. strategic capability gaps 
within the Arctic, asserting the need to: develop greater capabilities and capacity to protect 
U.S. sovereignty in the Arctic region; increase Arctic maritime domain awareness; and 
project U.S. maritime and aircraft presence in the Arctic reliant on a resilient C3ISR 
architecture to support essential U.S. interests [emphasis added].113 As previously 
mentioned in chapter one of this thesis, these strategic capability gaps would be reiterated 
in the key findings of the GAO assessment of the DOD’s 2011 Arctic Report and provide 
the genesis for future Arctic policy and investment development. 
D. SPACE COLLABORATIVE CAPACITY 
Since the 2011 NSSS, the U.S.’s space policy has argued for the pursuit of mutually 
beneficial agreements with key partners to “increase interoperability, compatibility, and 
integration of partner nations into appropriate DOD and [intelligence community] 
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networks to support information sharing and collective endeavors, taking affordability and 
mutual benefit into account.”114 The Obama administration’s 2013 National Strategy for 
the Arctic Region and subsequent 2016 implementation framework built on the Bush 
administration’s policy objectives, but emphasized collaborative and innovative 
approaches to strengthen international cooperation as well as the advancement of U.S. 
national security interests within the Arctic. Moreover, the Obama administration’s 2013 
National Strategy for the Arctic Region and 2010 NSP provided the guiding principles to 
establish a U.S. cooperative space strategy for the Arctic region. The Arctic strategy states, 
“Just as a common spirit and shared vision of peaceful partnership led to the development 
of an international space station, we believe much can be achieved in the Arctic region 
through collaborative international efforts, coordinated investments, and public-private 
partnerships.”115  
DOD joint doctrine highlights the importance of security cooperation initiatives, as 
they strengthen and expand the existing network of U.S. allies and partners and provide 
“ways and means to help achieve national security and foreign policy objectives.”116  
Likewise, the 2010 NSP directed the expansion of international cooperation on mutually 
beneficial space activities to “broaden and extend the benefits of space…[and] enhance 
collection and partnership in sharing of space-derived information.”117 The subsequent 
2011 NSSS and 2013 National Strategy for the Arctic Region further stressed the need to 
build Arctic awareness by strengthening international cooperation in space activities. It 
emphasized that the harsh, remote, and complex operating environment make the Arctic 
well-suited for collaborative efforts, and that space operations are uniquely qualified to 
meet the emerging threats.118 
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The shared imperative and responsibility for space security within the Arctic 
transcends the capabilities of individual nations, due to limited budgets and competing 
global requirements. As the most advanced spacefaring nation within the Arctic, the United 
States will pay disproportionally in providing space operations and associated capabilities 
to provide increased communications, navigation, and awareness of the Arctic. However, 
assisting “allies and partners in developing, acquiring, and employing their own space 
capabilities that complement and augment U.S. capabilities and contribute to coalition 
space operations”119 can advance U.S. national security interests and build coalition 
resiliency in the Arctic. In line with the Obama administration’s space policy objectives, 
and as an evolutionary shift in strategic thinking, U.S. space policy now seeks to increase 
“allied and partner access to and sharing of national security-related space technologies, 
information, and equipment required to support cooperative activities when advantageous 
to U.S. national security interests.”120 This shift in strategic engagement should help build 
space capacity and capability and expand collective security by enhancing communication, 
navigation, and awareness within the Arctic if advantageous to their domestic strategic 
objectives.  
The realization of the potentiality of collective space security through shared multi-
domain awareness and an extended communications architecture also demands new 
approaches to public-private partnerships in the space domain. A 2019 intelligence 
community threat assessment stated, “We continue to assess that the expansion of the 
global space industry will further extend space-enabled capabilities and space situational 
awareness to government, nonstate, and commercial actors in the next several years. All 
actors will increasingly have access to space-derived information services, such as 
imagery; weather; communications; and positioning, navigation, and timing (PNT).”121 A 
collaborative space concept sees this as an opportunity to support and facilitate civil, 
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commercial, defense, and multinational partners and leverage their shared resources and 
broader situational awareness to enhance Arctic regional security.122 In August 2020, 
James DeHart, the U.S. Coordinator for the Arctic, stated, “if you look at what is happening 
in our system over the last couple of months, you will see that we are launching a 
comprehensive and an integrated diplomatic approach and engagement in the Arctic 
region,” and that “in a few years, people will look back at this summer [of 2020] and see it 
as an important pivot point, a turning point, with a more sustained and enduring attention 
by the United States to the Arctic region.”123 However, although the current geostrategic 
environment has refocused U.S. attention on the Arctic due to polar great power 
competition, will the United States translate this to the space domain? For this to occur, the 
United States must turn intent into action and rhetoric into reality.  
E. ANALYSIS 
This analysis reviews the preceding four parts of this chapter to develop an 
understanding of how the United States might build and benefit from additional space 
collaborative capacity within the Arctic region.  
Based on part A, the United States has acknowledged the evolving geostrategic 
environment within the Arctic and has recognized the geostrategic importance the region 
contributes to U.S. national security of the homeland and abroad, environmental 
monitoring, and ensuring freedom of the seas for trade, aid, and combat projection. Space-
based solutions provide an economic, responsive, and reliable medium to mitigate U.S. 
strategic capability gaps within the region, but it is clear the United States must do more to 
address resource shortfalls. The Arctic provides a significant economic resource for the 
United States to exploit, and continued neglect of the region will likely see U.S. 
competitors fill the vacuum left by U.S. hesitancy. 
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Based on part B, this complex geostrategic environment will challenge the United 
States to maintain its competitive advantage over both Russia and China within the Arctic. 
The United States is in an era of polar great power competition. Consequently, the United 
States requires a careful balancing of competition on geopolitics, economics, technology, 
and infrastructure within the Arctic with cooperation particularly on economic aspects 
where Arctic allies and partners depend on China and Russia for economic growth. A 
comprehensive cooperative space strategy for the Arctic would need to consider these 
complex relationships while balancing Arctic allied and partner political objectives and 
strategic goals. Both China and Russia are indispensable economic opportunities while also 
a tangible threat within the Arctic. While Arctic allies and partners have maintained a 
policy of engagement with China and Russia within the Arctic, the United States must 
weigh the strategic calculus of leveraging a cooperative space strategy in the Arctic to 
mitigate its strategic capability gaps and assert its influence within the region. This could 
be complicated by the external security environment, economic relations, and domestic 
politics of not only its Arctic allies and partners, but domestic civil, commercial, and 
defense issues within the United States as well. 
Based on part C, although the United States has articulated national Arctic policies 
since the early 1970s, many of the policies have only been rhetoric deep with little 
substance delivered on grand promises. There has been a recent strategic shift with the 
reemergence of great power competition back to viewing the Arctic as a geostrategic 
theater for defense similar to the days of the Cold War. The Bush administration’s 
acknowledgement of the importance of maintaining freedom of the seas and differentiating 
the two polar regions provided a focused federal effort towards the Arctic. It is clear from 
the consistent political messaging across various presidential administrations that the 
United States has more in common with its Arctic allies and partners than opposed. This 
should contribute significantly to building collaborative capacity amongst partners due to 
a shared purpose and strategy amongst representatives.  
Based on part D, the United States has built the necessary structure and policy 
required to build space collaborative capacity. The 2010 NSP and subsequent 2011 NSSS, 
along with the associated 2013 National Strategy for the Arctic Region, established the 
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guiding principles for collaborative space activities within the region through a diplomatic 
lens of cooperation and mutual benefit to Arctic allies and partners. Additionally, strategic 
guidance fosters lateral mechanisms which encourage information sharing and 
collaborative learning to enhance space security cooperation within the Arctic. 
Furthermore, U.S. political leadership continued the momentum established during the 
Bush administration. The Obama administration refined the guidance and proposed 
implementation strategies, and the Trump administration continued to foster a spirit of 
cooperation with Arctic allies and partners through both the Department of Homeland 
Security and the State Department. Although recent U.S. domestic policies did create a 
period of friction amongst Arctic allies and partners during the Trump administration, 
longstanding cooperative engagement in Arctic intergovernmental forums continued 
bilateral, multilateral, and regional collaboration amongst Arctic allies and partners.  
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III. COMPLEXITY OF SPACE COLLECTIVE ACTION 
This chapter analyzes the challenges and opportunities of space collective action 
within the Arctic region, to include rationales for space collective action as well as the 
technical and geopolitical barriers to building space collaborative capacity, due to the harsh 
operating environment and geopolitical effects of broader strategic relationships. As 
previously mentioned in Chapter One of this thesis, the United States has significant 
capability gaps within the Arctic. As noted by the Arctic Collaborative Environment (ACE) 
report, “organizations with operational responsibility in the Arctic lack the capabilities 
necessary to meet emerging challenges and operational requirements in the region.”124 
This chapter seeks to identify rationales and common barriers to space collective action 
and highlight operational challenges and opportunities in implementing space solutions 
within the region. This chapter has two main parts separated by overarching themes. The 
first part assesses rationales for space collective action as they apply to the Arctic region. 
The second part describes the difficulties of building space collaborative capacity and 
identifies five common barriers to space collective action leveraging commonalities from 
research as a framework. The third part examines the preceding regional-specific 
opportunities and challenges identified to assess the likelihood of a cooperative space 
strategy materializing within the Arctic.  
A. SPACE COLLECTIVE ACTION: RATIONALES AND OPPORTUNITIES 
Since this thesis is seeking to answer how the United States might benefit from a 
cooperative space strategy for the Arctic, it is imperative to review rationales for space 
collective action and whether they apply to U.S. allies and partners within the Arctic region. 
As pointed out in the introduction to this thesis, to qualitatively evaluate the potential to 
build space collaborative capacity within the Arctic, this chapter leverages parts of the 
interorganizational collaborative capacity (ICC) model introduced by Hocevar as a 
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“conceptual framework to define organizational design strategies that enable 
multiorganizational and multinational efforts” for space security.125 This section leverages 
ICC design factors of purpose and strategy, people, and structure to analyze the domains 
that may  contribute to space collective action specific to the Arctic region.126 This section 
leverages these ICC design factors as a framework to assess rationales for space collective 
action to further the discussion of interorganizational space collaborative capacity within 
the Arctic. 
1. Purpose and Strategy 
The ICC model introduces the design factor of “purpose and strategy.” This 
encompasses felt need, strategic actions, and resource investment.127 As previously 
covered, the United States has established national space and Arctic policies with the 
intended purpose of leveraging Arctic allies and partners to address national interests 
within the region. Through these recent strategic documents, policy roadmaps, and 
implementation plans, the United States has a defined U.S. Arctic strategy, but this has 
been insufficient to transform rhetoric into reality, as the United States still maintains the 
same strategic capability gaps within the region. The design factor is a combination of 
purpose and strategy (emphasis added). As concluded in a CSIS report on current 
challenges and new opportunities for cooperation in the Arctic from 2010, “The United 
States must now act to implement this strategy and identify the political will and 
accompanying resources today to accomplish its stated objectives.”128 Unfortunately, 
similar to the GAO’s assessment of the DOD’s 2011 Arctic report, the report from 2010 
has many relevant conclusions that continue today but lack the committed resources or 
political will to implement recommended changes. Although each of these reports does not 
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explicitly address space collective action as a solution to addressing critical capability 
challenges within the Arctic, many of their conclusions remain relevant to building space 
collaborative capacity within the Arctic by leveraging allies and partners within the region 
that share interests in Arctic affairs. 
So how does the United States build the political will to allocate resources to 
sufficiently address Arctic challenges and transform rhetoric into reality? Dr. Michael 
Gleason, a national security senior project engineer and national security space expert, 
from the Aerospace Corporation’s Center for Space Policy and Strategy, and Charity 
Weeden, a fellow at the Canadian Global Affairs Institute, identify five critical rationales 
for alliances and partnerships to build closer space security collaboration.129 Gleason and 
Weeden point out that space collective action provides collective deterrence, combined 
resources, information sharing, geographical advantage, and political and strategic 
legitimacy opportunities to member states. Although these opportunities offered by space 
collective action are not unique to the Arctic region, the uniqueness of the Arctic’s 
geography contributes to the applicability of space solutions due to the harsh environment 
and its location on the Earth’s poles. 
First, Gleason and Weeden propose that alliances and partnerships within the space 
domain provide strategic deterrence. They argue that “allies and partners in security space 
activities contribute to the perception of U.S. strength and leadership, and thereby bolster 
strategic and conventional deterrence.”130 Previously introduced space power theories in 
Chapter One of this thesis, by Moltz and Lambakis, reinforce these concepts. The 
understanding that “attacking a coalition of countries, in addition to the United States, 
widens a conflict beyond the United States, [and] defense space partnerships make it more 
costly and complicated for an adversary to strike [space assets and capabilities],”131 
reinforces the perception of U.S. strength within the region. These theories essentially 
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argue that interoperability of partnered forces within the space domain creates a more 
resilient space network that complicates potential adversaries’ decision-making calculus 
and reinforces the asymmetric advantage of the United States’ alliance network over Russia 
and China. 
Secondly, Gleason and Weeden assert that space collective action contributes 
additional resources to the United States’ space architecture. The United States and its 
Arctic allies and partners have more capability and capacity within the space domain by 
operating together. They argue that “the space resources allies bring [,] improve deterrence 
by increasing space domain ‘mission assurance,’ which includes resilient capabilities, the 
ability to rapidly reconstitute lost capabilities, and operations to defend space 
capabilities.”132 They further emphasize that “allies and partners may also offer niche 
space capabilities that are driven by domestic priorities and are otherwise unavailable to 
the United States.”133 These additional resources and capabilities can mitigate U.S. 
strategic capability gaps within the Arctic and provide an avenue for smaller space 
programs to contribute to a larger space alliance or bilateral partnership.  
2. People 
Another design factor the ICC model introduces is “people” which encompasses 
the individual, societal, and cultural collaborative potential to build space collaborative 
capacity.134 As mentioned previously, the United States maintains considerable defense 
and diplomatic partnerships amongst the Arctic nations. The more similar the domestic 
policies and ideologies of states, the more likely they are to cooperate and partner with one 
another to build space collaborative capacity. The Arctic region is a key focus area of 
Canadian and Nordic foreign policies. A 2019 Congressional Research Service (CRS) 
report stated, “The Nordic countries are troubled by the environmental and geostrategic 
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implications of climate change in the Arctic.”135 It goes on to say, “Like the United States, 
the Nordic countries are wary of enhanced Russian military and commercial activity in the 
Arctic, as well as China’s growing interests and investments in the region.”136  
Additionally, a 2018 NATO Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence 
(STRATCOM COE) report, emphasized that Canada sees itself as “a ‘responsible steward’ 
of Arctic governance and the guardian of its fragile eco-system.” The report goes on to say 
that “exercising national sovereignty and emphasising [sic] the regional rather than 
international nature of the ‘North’ has always been considered the cornerstone of Canadian 
Arctic policy.”137 These shared concerns amongst the Nordic countries, Canada, and the 
United States of outside influence within the region and the need for environmental 
monitoring and enhanced domain awareness build shared grievances and a desire to 
collaborate with like-minded nations.  
However, the Arctic security environment is incredibly complex due to the various 
interorganizational memberships of the Arctic states and the historical influence of the 
region’s two superpowers of Russia and the United States. To capture the full complexity 
of Arctic geopolitical issues is well beyond the scope of this section. However, building 
space collaborative capacity between the United States and its Arctic allies and partners 
contributes to solving many shared geostrategic concerns within the Arctic, including high-
latitude communications, navigation, maritime domain awareness, weather forecasting, 
and environmental monitoring. Additionally, a CSIS article from 2021 on leveraging allies 
and partners within the Arctic highlighted several security and defense issues of 
convergence amongst the U.S. and its allies and partners within the region. Key among 
them were credible national defense capabilities, resilience in space capabilities, enhanced 
security cooperation, domain awareness, developing resilient infrastructure, and improving 
 
135 Kristin Archick, The Nordic Countries and U.S. Relations, CRS Report No. IF10740 (Washington, 
DC: Congressional Research Service, 2019), 2, https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/IF10740.pdf.  
136 Archick,  2. 
137 NATO, Arctic Narratives and Political Values: Russia, China and Canada in the High North, 
prepared by the NATO Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence, ISBN: 978–9934-564-20-1, 
September 2018, 22; 24, https://stratcomcoe.org/publications/arctic-narratives-and-political-values-russia-
china-and-canada-in-the-high-north/116. 
46 
crisis response and search-and-rescue capacity in the High North.138 These critical issues 
within security and defense contribute to building space collective action within the region. 
Furthermore, space collective action amongst U.S. allies and partners within the 
Arctic provides legitimacy and access for U.S. space operations and associated capabilities. 
Gleason and Weeden point out that space collective action provides political legitimacy 
through strategic engagements abroad and within domestic politics. They emphasize a 
generally accepted strategic truth, that “multilateral security activities generally have more 
legitimacy than unilateral action in the international community.”139 Moreover, they 
emphasize that geography matters in space collective action. They point out the 
geographical advantages of space collective action stating, “Allies and partners allow U.S. 
forces on their territory which provides the U.S. the ability to project power, establish 
forward presence, and contribute to shaping the local and regional environment.”140 These 
geographical advantages provide the United States access and proximity for space ground 
stations and counterspace capabilities.  
3. Structure  
The last design factor within the ICC model this section incorporates is “structure” 
which encompasses organizations and collaboration structures to support building space 
collaborative capacity.141 Fortunately for the United States, the Arctic region has 
substantial bilateral, multilateral, and interorganizational agreements combined with a 
historic cooperative spirit of engagement amongst the Arctic states on Arctic affairs. 
Although the Arctic Council is the premier interorganizational forum within the Arctic 
consisting of the eight Arctic states, the Arctic states are also members of NATO, the 
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Nordic Defence Cooperation (NORDEFCO),142 ESA, and the European Union (EU), 
amongst other organizations and international forums. However, none of these 
organizations except for the Arctic Council focuses solely on Arctic affairs. These existing 
interorganizational forums provide the structure necessary to build space collaborative 
capacity within the Arctic. They support bilateral, multilateral, and intergovernmental 
collaboration efforts in terms of goals, constraints, and authorities.143  
Although the Arctic Council is the premier intergovernmental forum within the 
Arctic, it consistently avoids controversial issues, including politically charged defense and 
security challenges. Olav Schram Stokke. a research professor at the Fridtjof Nansen 
Institute in Norway, asserts that the Arctic Council has had a “niche orientation toward 
non-controversial matters like fact finding and capacity enhancement, rather than 
politically contested issues related to regulations of economic or military activity.”144 
However, the Council is responsible for multiple multilateral agreements amongst the 
Arctic states to include the 2011 “Agreement on Cooperation on Aeronautical and 
Maritime Search and Rescue in the Arctic”145 and the 2017 “Agreement on Enhancing 
International Arctic Scientific Cooperation.”146 These agreements prove the Arctic 
Council provides a legitimate structure to build collaboration.  
However, the Council’s reluctance to focus on potentially controversial defense 
issues could possibly prevent any significant space collaborative capacity agreements that 
address specific U.S. defense capability shortfalls. This diplomatic reality means that the 
United States will likely have to seek other intergovernmental forums or create additional 
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forums to promote space collective action in the Arctic. As concluded in a 2010 CSIS 
report on current challenges and new opportunities for cooperation in the Arctic, the United 
States must first “clarify its preferred institutional framework for working with the Arctic 
littoral states and other nations interested in the region.”147  
Should the United States seek bilateral negotiations with Arctic allies and security 
partners or leverage interorganizational talks with NATO,148 ESA, or NORDEFCO? 
Bilateral negotiations provide an avenue to advocate for Arctic agreements with 
stakeholders that contribute to Arctic affairs without building consensus amongst the 
group. However, the complexity of U.S. Arctic allies and partners’ membership in a 
multitude of organizations complicates negotiations and further exacerbates challenges in 
building space collaborative capacity. Conversely, the intergovernmental forums provide 
significant resources and capacity that offer a more systematic approach to addressing 
space collaborative capacity.  
Does the United States need to create a joint task force under USNORTHCOM 
specific to the Arctic to focus on Arctic affairs or stand back up the NATO Allied Forces 
Northern Europe (AFNORTH) command stood down in 1994? These arrangements would 
provide a military regionally aligned command explicitly focused on addressing Arctic 
challenges within the space domain. As the most prominent space power within the Arctic, 
the United States should take a leadership role in determining the structure that it believes 
will create the most significant potential to building space collaborative capacity within the 
Arctic if it aligns with its national interests. 
As the premier space power within the Arctic, Gleason and Weeden argue that the 
United States must project strength by leading and supporting coalition space collective 
action and drive “the development of interoperable and resilient systems and 
capabilities.”149 Whether the United States builds space collaborative capacity through 
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bilateral, multilateral, or intergovernmental engagement is irrelevant if the result addresses 
strategic shortfalls within the region. However, offering incentives and rewards to its allies 
and partners through space and security related benefits could assist in building space 
collaborative capacity within the Arctic and create strategic deterrence, greater resources, 
and a more resilient space network amongst Arctic allies and partners.  
B. BARRIERS TO SPACE COLLECTIVE ACTION  
The third hypothesis presented in Chapter One of this thesis proposed that a more 
robust Arctic cooperative space strategy will fail to materialize due to a combination of 
regional-specific challenges. Although the United States has acknowledged the need to 
build space collaborative capacity in the Arctic through national space policies, and DOD 
and Department of Homeland Security (DHS) strategies,150 there are still significant 
challenges to overcome in implementing a comprehensive space cooperative strategy. Even 
if Arctic states seek to implement space collective action initiatives in good faith, there are 
still substantial roadblocks that inhibit alliance formation, burden sharing, and 
collaboration within the space domain. This section identifies five common barriers to 
building space collaborative capacity related to the Arctic region that were consistent 
themes from the author’s research. These common themes consisted of political, 
organizational, technological, economic, and cultural barriers.  
Gleason and Weeden reinforce these barriers to cooperation and collaboration 
within their research, acknowledging the challenges of legal and policy constraints, 
organizational complexities, technological disparities and inter-operability limitations, 
budgeting and burden sharing, and cultural issues as common barriers to building space 
collaborative capacity.151 Additionally, they point out that the relative significance of each 
of these barriers for bilateral, multilateral, and intergovernmental cooperation within the 
space domain varies depending on the countries involved. Furthermore, they state that “an 
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appreciation for these roadblocks can help the coalition to anticipate where problems will 
arise and help prioritize efforts to overcome them.”152 If the United States seeks to build a 
cooperative space strategy for the Arctic region, it needs to understand these challenges 
and mobilize resources necessary to establish practical cooperation based on mutual benefit 
and the geostrategic realities of the region. 
1. Political 
The first common barrier to building space collaborative capacity within the Arctic 
is the political barrier inclusive of domestic legal and policy constraints, the current 
multipolar international system, and political inconsistency. Leavitt points out that building 
political mobilization is necessary to drive space collective action. According to Leavitt, 
political mobilization starts by recognizing shared grievances, appropriately framing 
narratives, leveraging political opportunities, and mobilizing the resources required to 
achieve the desired objective.153 The United States has recognized the shared grievances 
by prioritizing strategic areas for engagement, and has promulgated strategic guidance to 
frame the narrative of the geostrategic importance of the Arctic. Additionally, as previously 
discussed, the United States has begun to leverage the expansion of Russian military 
presence and increase in Chinese economic investment in the region as political 
opportunities for engagement. However, thus far, the United States has been unable to 
mobilize the necessary resources to meet its stated objectives. This section examines the 
political barriers preventing the required allocation of resources and highlights potential 
avenues for future engagement. 
Gleason and Weeden point out that legal and policy constraints are often inhibiting 
factors in space collaborative initiatives. They state, “In some cases, allied collaboration is 
discouraged or blocked by domestic law, regulation, and political factors including 
industrial base and trade strategies that are embedded in domestic laws and regulations.”154 
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According to John Hoffner in an Aerospace Security report for CSIS, “While the United 
States has historically been both the world leader in space and the leading advocate for free 
markets and open trade, it has also been one of the only countries in the world to restrict 
exports of commercial satellites on the basis of arms control.”155 He goes on to say that 
“Beginning in 1976, the United States has generally regulated commercial satellites as a 
defense article and…controlled exports through the United States Department of State’s 
International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) on the United States Munitions List 
(USML).”156 These export controls significantly limited the ability of the United States to 
conduct cooperative space agreements and prevented space technology sharing with many 
of its allies. A 2007 report led by the Air Force Research Laboratory (AFRL), with support 
from the Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Industry and Security, concluded, “ITAR 
has either directly or indirectly precipitated the global competition and is a significant 
impediment to the United States space industry’s ability to market to foreign buyers.”157 
Furthermore, the regulations encouraged European nations to seek space autonomy and 
contributed to establishing ESA.  
European space autonomy has led to ESA initiatives that are often redundant rather 
than complementary to U.S. space systems, creating a competitive rather than a cooperative 
model. A 2007 white paper published by the Space Foundation in Colorado Springs, 
Colorado, concluded that ITAR restrictions contributed to the United States “effectively 
ceding the dominant position in space that it has enjoyed for some time by allowing the 
expertise of the U.S. space industry to deteriorate…and allowed global competitors to catch 
up in the global aerospace marketplace.”158 While this report is likely hyperbole 
considering the United States has maintained its dominant position in space, the reports 
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conclude that the legal restrictions of ITAR diminished U.S. space collaborative capacity 
with its European Arctic allies and partners and degraded the integration of space systems. 
An example includes ESA’s Galileo global navigation satellite system (GNSS). Although 
the EU and the United States would eventually sign an agreement in 2004 to mitigate signal 
duplicity and contamination, the Galileo program was initially seen as redundant and even 
dangerous to U.S. planners that felt the technology could be used by potential adversaries 
against U.S. forces or positions.159 However, recent cooperative agreements have seen the 
Galileo satellites offer redundancy and increase mission assurance for U.S. Arctic allies 
and partners. Leveraging both global positioning signal (GPS) and Galileo PNT data 
contributes to navigation and search and rescue (SAR) functions in the High North.160  
Additionally, the current multipolar international system sees Russia, China, and 
the United States competing for influence in polar great power competition within the 
Arctic. This increased competition within the region complicates traditional U.S. Arctic 
allied and partner frameworks, creating uncertainty and impediments politically when it 
comes to the transfer of sensitive space information or minimizing near-peer competitor 
access to astrostrategic locations. The Arctic has seen an expansion of Chinese space 
ground infrastructure with Arctic allies and partners providing access and geographical 
advantage to Chinese space activities. According to Jana Robinson from the Prague 
Security Studies Institute, “China has sought to position itself as a stakeholder in the 
region…In the past decade, its interests [in the Arctic] have expanded, encompassing 
exploration, commercial, shipping, and space activities.”161 China is establishing a global 
network of space ground infrastructure that provides geographic access and capability with 
increased download speeds and greater coverage area. China currently has its Arctic space 
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ground stations “in Kiruna (Sweden), Karholl (Iceland), Ny-Ålesund (Svalbard), and 
Longyearbyen (Svalbard), and plans to establish ones in Finland (Sodankyla) and 
Greenland (Nuuk).”162 Of note, Sweden’s state-owned space company running the Kiruna 
ground station stated in 2020 that it would not “renew contracts with China or accept new 
Chinese business, because of changes in geopolitics.”163 Additionally, in 2017, China 
attempted to obtain three commercial airports in Greenland before the agreement was 
terminated due to concerns expressed by Denmark and the United States.164 These 
examples highlight the complicated geopolitics of the region. Moreover, multipolar 
competition in the Arctic acts as a political barrier to U.S. space collective action that must 
be mitigated to facilitate space cooperative capacity.  
Furthermore, political inconsistency about space collaborative initiatives is another 
political barrier to overcome. Knipfer points out that “Incorporating foreign partners into a 
space project provides it a level of political commitment that buffers it from cancellation, 
to the extent that domestic political leadership is unwilling to break international 
agreements.”165 As space systems and acquisition programs often require significant 
resources and time to develop, changing political stances from one U.S. administration to 
the next significantly impacts building space collaborative capacity amongst Arctic allies 
and partners. Changing priorities of separate administrations have seen the political will to 
act on Arctic strategic initiatives fluctuate with domestic priorities elsewhere. As the Arctic 
only has approximately four million inhabitants across the eight Arctic states,166 the 
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constituency demand from the domestic audience to political leadership is low. These 
political barriers demonstrate the challenges that the U.S. could have in implementing a 
coherent strategy amongst its Arctic partners.  
2. Organizational 
The second common barrier to building space collaborative capacity within the 
Arctic is the organizational barrier inclusive of structural consistency, and organizational 
culture and priorities. Gleason and Weeden’s research showed that organizational 
bureaucratic barriers specific to “organizational scale, priorities, rules, regulations, 
workflow processes, and organizational culture” are likely some of the most challenging 
barriers to space collective action.167 Although the Arctic enjoys significant regional 
collaboration on several key issues, there is no established regional forum specific to space 
cooperation inclusive of the United States and its allies and partners.  
Structural inconsistency among U.S. presidential administrations has seen 
coordination at the national level fluctuate across administrations. In July 2014, following 
the publication of the national Arctic strategy in 2013, then-Secretary of State John Kerry 
announced the appointment of retired Coast Guard Admiral Robert J. Papp Jr. as the first 
U.S. Special Representative for the Arctic. However, after the Obama administration ended 
in January 2017, the position was left vacant until July 2020, when the Trump 
administration eventually created a new post with James DeHart acting as the first U.S. 
Coordinator for the Arctic region.168 These inconsistencies carried over into the space 
domain as well. The George H.W. Bush administration established the National Space 
Council through Executive Order 12675 to coordinate civil, commercial, national security, 
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and international space policy matters.169 However, following the Bush administration, 
the Clinton administration disbanded the council, and the National Science and Technology 
Council (NSTC) absorbed its functions. The National Space Council would not return until 
the Trump administration re-established it in June 2017.170 This organizational and 
political inconsistency at the executive level of government limited interagency 
coordination specific to space and the Arctic. Furthermore, these barriers complicated 
enduring partnership activities amongst Arctic allies and partners within the region as space 
activities were primarily absorbed into scientific and environmental collaboration focused 
on cognitive space collaboration rather than normative issues like multi-domain awareness, 
communications, remote-sensing, and national security collaboration. 
In his study on international cooperation and competition in space, Cody Knipfer 
highlights a key organizational barrier to building comprehensive space collaborative 
capacity, noting that, “space cooperation is often limited to scientific and exploratory 
endeavors whose primary purposes are not distinctly political, military, or economic.” He 
concludes that “these projects do not provide the same direct competitive advantage that 
gains in political influence, economic power, or national security do.” Many of the current 
space collaborative initiatives within the Arctic can be characterized in the same manner 
with scientific and environmental priorities taking precedence in space collaboration. Two 
examples are ESA’s Polaris Initiative and the United States’ Interagency Arctic Research 
Policy Committee (IARPC) under the Office of Science & Technology Policy.  
The Polaris Initiative, supported by ESA and EU, seeks to enhance space-based 
monitoring of the polar regions through the development of next-generation space 
infrastructure and the exploration of new sensors, orbital parameters, constellations, and 
integrated platforms, as well as increase collaboration with new user communities and 
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develop new partnerships and joint initiatives.171 The 2016 study conclusions “are 
intended to help develop new space mission concepts for the polar regions that address 
evolving scientific and operational information needs.”172 Similarly, the IARPC consists 
of 16 agencies, departments, and offices across the U.S. federal government responsible 
for enhancing science and technology research in the Arctic.173 Initially established in July 
2010 as an interagency working group of the NSTC under the Committee on Environment, 
the IARPC now is a separate council under the Committee on Environment with the 
director of the National Science Foundation (NSF) as the chair. The IARPC creates the 
five-year Arctic Research Plans and coordinates science and technology integration within 
the Arctic across the interagency.174 Although these scientific organizations provide the 
necessary governance framework within the Arctic for European and North American 
Arctic space collaboration, they focus mainly on scientific and environmental cognitive 
programs. However, it should be noted that although these efforts focus on scientific 
research and environmental monitoring, the duality of space-based systems and space 
ground infrastructure contribute to political, military, and economic space collaborative 
capacity within the Arctic. A satellite conducting remote sensing of ice flows and ocean 
temperatures, or a ground station providing weather and atmospheric coverage, can 
contribute or complement receiving data and information relevant to national security. 
Furthermore, Gleason and Weeden highlight the scale and resources of U.S. space 
operations and related interagency organizations as an organizational barrier to building 
space collective capacity within the region.175 For example, the Norwegian Space Agency 
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(NOSA), responsible for organizing Norwegian space activities and coordinating national 
space activities, has 40 employees and no assigned space personnel within its defense 
organizations.176 Additionally, the National Space Institute at the Technical University of 
Denmark (DTU Space) has about 190 employees working with ESA and NASA.177 
Compare this to the nearly 17,000 employees working for NASA,178 or the extensive 
interagency space organizations across the United States space enterprise. Gleason and 
Weeden point out that “this is a problem of scale.” Whether the United States seeks space 
collective action with its Arctic allies and partners or not, integrating people and resources 
to create “mirror-image” or similar positions, ranks, and organizational structure amongst 
its Arctic allies, apart from Canada, is likely unachievable in the near term. Leavitt clearly 
articulates this issue, stating, “Certainly, not all states have the desire or geographic, 
economic, or technological requirements to become [premier space powers].”179 However, 
she points out that investment in space collaborative initiatives opens market opportunities, 
strengthens regional cohesion, and provides access to partner infrastructure. 
3. Technological  
The third common barrier to building space collaborative capacity within the Arctic 
is the technological barrier inclusive of technology disparity, system compatibility, and 
data-sharing restrictions and limitations. Moltz’s research highlights the term “techno-
nationalism,” commonly used by Joan Johnson-Freese, to characterize patterns of 
competition and cooperation. Techno-nationalism is characterized by seeking 
“technological autonomy rather than the cost savings to be achieved through a division of 
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labor with other spacefaring nations.”180 Although the Arctic region has seen significant 
space program integration within the civil sector, cooperation within the security sector 
amongst spacefaring Arctic states as a region, or a separate supranational forum, has 
remained elusive. This can largely be attributed to the competition between the United 
States’ NASA and ESA with redundant capabilities sought after to ensure European 
autonomy from the United States. This techno-nationalism persists today with the dual 
space programs separated largely by United States-Canadian space defense partnerships in 
the North American Arctic and Canada-Nordic space civil cooperation in the European 
Arctic.  
Additionally, Gleason and Weeden point out that, “U.S., allied and partner 
interoperability issues often result from incompatible technology, systems, networks, and 
data.” They go on to emphasize that “systems that were designed and built without 
consideration of allied participation not surprisingly are difficult to use in an allied 
construct.”181 As discussed in the previous chapter, space collective activities can reduce 
budgetary cost and increase programmatic and political sustainability of systems and 
programs while increasing interoperability and reducing redundancy and waste between 
programs. However, as pointed out in a study on managed international cooperation in 
space activities, Broniatowski argues that international cooperation must be explicitly 
incorporated from the outset of a regional or functional strategy. He argues that this enables 
coordination and collaboration prior to the start of new programs and enhances 
interoperability to create what Broniatowski terms “critical path redundancy.” This 
prevents one partner from hindering or preventing collaboration due to legal and policy 
constraints, technological disparity, or system incompatibility.182 As the preeminent space 
power within the Arctic, the United States could create a pathway for space integration and 
systems standardization by leading regional space collaborative initiatives within the 
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Arctic’s nascent and emerging space programs to mitigate regional capability gaps that 
align with domestic priorities.  
Moreover, information sharing, or the dissemination of data, can be one of the most 
difficult challenges to overcome when creating space collaborative capacity amongst allies 
and partners. In his study on international cooperation and competition in space, Knipfer 
notes, “as partnership on a project often entails transfer of technology or knowledge, states 
are reluctant to ‘give away’ sensitive military or economic information and 
capabilities.”183 Additionally, Alan Scott, a retired U.S. Navy Captain and space policy 
expert, highlighted that “one of the most significant challenges to the development of an 
allied space ISR network is the establishment of a robust data archival and dissemination 
system.”184  Scott emphasized that dissemination of data was an issue of interoperability 
between systems and hardware and a significant security classification issue amongst allies 
and partners. However, he was optimistic that the United States could use previous Arctic 
space collective action models to build future space collaborative capacity.  
Scott highlighted the data-sharing arrangements between the United States and 
Norway and Canada, stating, “Although operated exclusively by Norwegian personnel and 
administrated by the Norwegian Intelligence Service, the U.S.-developed Globus II radar 
is also part of the U.S. [space surveillance network (SSN)]. Another noteworthy example 
is an effort to integrate data from the Canadian Sapphire space-based optical sensor and 
several ground-based telescopes into the U.S. SSN.”185  Scott concluded that the 
“processes and procedures developed to integrate data from Globus II and the Canadian 
Surveillance of Space Project (SofSP) into the U.S. SSN could be expanded to include 
sensors from other nations.”186 The United States could use these examples and others as 
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a framework to encourage additional partnership opportunities that align with national 
interest to expand information sharing amongst Arctic allies and partners within the space 
domain. 
Furthermore, system compatibility is another barrier to space collective action 
within the Arctic. The 2013 ACE Joint Capability Technology Demonstration (JCTD)187 
clearly articulated this lack of compatibility amongst Arctic space activities, stating, “There 
exists no Arctic awareness, decision-support system to enable long-term environmental 
planning, near-term cooperative actions, and real-time responses to humanitarian, 
environmental, and security issues in the Arctic.”188 The ACE recognized the issues with 
building space collaborative capacity within the Arctic and sought to address them through 
“an internet-based, open-access, Arctic-focused, environmental research and decision 
support system that integrates data from existing remote sensing assets with products from 
existing and new environmental models” to provide analysis of the environment across the 
region.189 Although this program was only a technology demonstration, the program’s 
contributors understood the complexity, insufficient resources, and common grievances 
shared across the civil, commercial, defense, and interagency in addressing space collective 
action. A cooperative regional space concept could see this framework expanded across 
the civil, commercial, and defense sectors to incorporate the mosaic of sensors in and 
passing over the region.  
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4. Economic 
The fourth common barrier to building space collaborative capacity within the 
Arctic is the economic barrier, including burden sharing, budgeting disparity, and 
investment priorities. In his work on space policy in developing countries, Robert Harding 
points out that “the decision to invest in a national space policy has been predicated not 
only on the desire for obtaining these technological advances but, when the financial and 
geopolitical circumstances allow and/or dictate, to address the perceived national security 
needs of the state.”190 The emerging geostrategic environment requires enhanced 
capabilities and capacity to address increased human activity and attention by great powers 
within the Arctic. Fortunately, there is a general consensus amongst U.S. allies and partners 
that space-based solutions provide the best medium to address these issues. However, 
Stavridis points out that, “While the northern European nations all have long traditions of 
engagement in the Arctic, they collectively lack sufficient resources, geopolitical influence, 
or populations to make a strong case for deep involvement at the level of Russia, Canada, 
and the United States.”191 
This is further complicated by the economic impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on 
the region. Norway’s currency experienced a record collapse as oil prices plummeted and 
regional tourism fell by as much as 95 percent within the region.192 Heider Gudjonsson, 
the Icelandic chairman of the Arctic Economic Council, reported on the economic impact, 
stating, “If globalization slows down, the impact is felt twice as hard in the Arctic.”193 
Furthermore, Le Mière and Mazo point out in their research, “The Nordic nations are, by 
and large, seeing shrinking defence budgets and personnel numbers, which is being 
countered by the purchase of fewer numbers of high-tech equipment and greater regional 
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defence coordination.”194 While Le Mière and Mazo’s work was published in 2013, this 
trend is only beginning to alter slightly with incremental increases since 2016 in defense 
budgets complementing the changing geostrategic focus on the Arctic. Defense spending 
accounted for 1.1 percent of Sweden’s GDP in 2019 compared to around 2.5 percent at the 
end of the Cold War.195 Sweden’s space budget totaled approximately 111 million dollars 
for ESA in 2019, accounting for about 75% of its total space budget.196 Similarly, 
Norway’s defense expenditures went from around 2.8 to 1.6 percent in the same period, 
with the funding for space activities totaling approximately 154 million dollars in 2020.,197 
Compared to the U.S. Space Force fiscal year 2021 budget of 15.2 billion dollars, these 
numbers are a fraction of the space expenditure of the United States.198  
Additionally, Gleason and Weeden illustrate the complexity of the U.S. budget and 
acquisition process. They highlight that, “Allies and partners try to align the timing of their 
contributions with U.S. timelines in order to maximize their contribution to burden sharing 
and justify their investments to their domestic political leaders and public.”199 
Additionally, their research points out that many of the Arctic nations do not possess 
military space programs and thus are unable to commit to long-term projects with sustained 
spending levels in space defense activities. These circumstances emphasize that if the 
United States seeks regional space collective action, it will likely have to take the lead to 
provide an avenue for Arctic allies and partners to contribute where they can. This will 
require a comprehensive approach to space collective action, as space defense expenditures 
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by the United States may have to be complemented by civil or scientific expenditures by 
an Arctic partner that does not share a similar dedicated space defense budget. 
Moreover, Bleddyn Bowen, a lecturer in International Relations with research 
interests in space strategy and space power theory at the University of Leicester, argues 
that the United States must be “clearer on what it would prefer its allies to be spending on 
space, rather than just demanding its allies spend more.”200 Bowen encourages the United 
States to consider advising smaller U.S. allies and partners to increase collaboration on 
space capability development in areas of mutual benefit, rather than building duplicate or 
redundant space capabilities that add little value and capacity to a broad alliance or 
coalition space network.201 Bowen further advocates that the United States should 
encourage smaller allies and partners “to invest in small satellite-based intelligence, 
surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) platforms, small polar launches, and Space 
Situational Awareness [systems and capabilities].”202 Scott reinforces this argument 
stating, “existing SSA and ISR capabilities as described [within his work] can be leveraged 
to provide the foundation for development of an integrated allied space architecture to 
address those specific space mission areas.”203 The United States could leverage these 
niche capabilities and geographic advantages of Arctic allies and partners to address its 
strategic capability gaps within the region. This form of burden-sharing could open the 
doors for greater involvement from smaller space programs and expand the United States’ 
inventory of potential partners within the space domain to address niche program areas. 
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Some examples of these niche capabilities are Sweden’s future polar launch initiatives or 
Denmark’s focus on small satellite procurement.,204  
Furthermore, as mentioned previously in Chapter Two of this thesis, Chinese 
economic competition with the United States for influence within the region has reduced 
the United States’ percentage of trade, aid, and influence among the Arctic states compared 
to Chinese investment. From a trade perspective, although the five Nordic countries’ main 
trading partners are member states of the EU, China accounts for a significant and growing 
percentage of their gross domestic product (GDP). For example, Norway’s trade with 
China increased from 9.2 to 10.2 percent from 2013 to 2019.205 Although the United 
States’ investment in Norway increased following the Obama administration’s Arctic 
strategy in 2013, it still only accounted for 7.9 percent of Norway’s imports by 2019.206 
The trade disparity with Denmark is even more stark. China increased its trade with 
Denmark in the same period to 7.3 percent of imports and further invested heavily in 
Greenland, accounting for 21.7 percent of all exports.207 Compare that to the United States, 
only accounting for 3.4 percent of Danish imports in 2019.208 Although these percentages 
are only a snapshot of time, Chinese economic investment in the region continues to grow 
as the United States comparatively lags. Two exceptions to this are U.S. investment in 
Canada and Iceland, with U.S. trade still surpassing Chinese economic investment. 
However, due to Iceland’s geostrategic importance along China’s “Polar Silk Road,” China 
signed a free trade agreement with Iceland in 2013, making it the first European country to 
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do so, further complicating China’s access to Arctic resources and geographic 
advantages.209 
5. Cultural 
The fifth common barrier to building space collaborative capacity within the Arctic 
is the cultural barrier, including Arctic identity, domestic policy, and national interests. 
Gleason and Weeden point out that cultural considerations must be considered when 
building space collective action, emphasizing that the United States should prioritize 
further understanding of Arctic allies and partners’ domestic priorities to enhance space 
collaboration.210 Additionally, Knipfer emphasizes that, “Countries are inherently self-
interested; their activity in and use of space serves a distinct goal—political, economic, 
scientific, or national security—that brings them benefit, international competitive 
advantage, and justifies the costs and complexities involved in a space program.”211 A 
literature review of alliance theory and coalition operations reinforces this theme. 
However, he acknowledges that even if allies pursue space cooperation out of self-interest, 
the partnership’s benefits are significant and often of mutual benefit considering the 
multitude of rationales discussed earlier in this chapter. 
Despite a reemergence of U.S. interests in the Arctic due to the rapidly changing 
environmental and geostrategic challenges, a recent EU report from 2020, on developing 
an updated EU Arctic policy, highlighted that “Recent surveys conducted in late 2019 
reveal that Americans ‘mildly disagree with the assertion that the United States is an Arctic 
nation with broad and fundamental interests in the region.’ In fact, compared to 2017, fewer 
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people agreed with that assertion.”212 These surveys potentially exhibit the United States’ 
continued reluctance to assert itself as an Arctic power. Additionally, they will likely 
continue to challenge U.S. political leadership to transform recent rhetoric into reality. This 
cultural barrier within the United States’ own reluctance to relate and engage in Arctic 
matters highlights the challenges of creating the political will to address Arctic geostrategic 
challenges.  
Additionally, Gleason and Weeden highlight that “differing priorities among 
bureaucratic stakeholders produces inertia that may not be transparent and is difficult to 
overcome.”213 Whereas the EU Arctic states’ three main priorities within the Arctic remain 
soft power issues of climate change, sustainable development, and international 
cooperation, the United States has prioritized hard security issues within the region with 
the DOD in the lead.214 Since July 2020, the DOD and DHS have published Arctic 
strategies for the Departments of the Army,215 Navy,216 and Air Force,217 as well as the 
Coast Guard under DHS.218 Additionally, the Arctic Domain Awareness Center (ADAC) 
leads space collaboration initiatives as a DHS Center of Excellence hosted through the 
 
212 European Parliament, European Union, “In-Depth Analysis: A Balanced Arctic Policy for the 
EU,” Policy Department for External Relations, Directorate General for External Policies of the Union 
(July 2020), PE 603.498, 22–23, 
https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/IDAN/2020/603498/EXPO_IDA(2020)603498_EN.pdf. 
213 Gleason and Weeden, “Alliance Rationales & Roadblocks: A U.S. – Canada Space Study,” 5. 
214 European Parliament, European Union, “In-Depth Analysis: A Balanced Arctic Policy for the 
EU,” 43. 
215 Department of the Army, Regaining Arctic Dominance (Washington, DC: Department of the 
Army, 2021), https://api.army.mil/e2/c/downloads/2021/03/15/9944046e/regaining-arctic-dominance-us-
army-in-the-arctic-19-january-2021-unclassified.pdf. 




217 Department of the Air Force, The Department of the Air Force Arctic Strategy (2020). 
218 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Strategic Approach for Arctic Homeland Security. 
67 
University of Alaska.219 The EU attributes this organizational cultural barrier as a 
tendency of U.S. policy to lean towards hard power initiatives due to the large 
infrastructure and budgets within the DOD. The EU Arctic report emphasizes the role of 
the DOD in Arctic collaboration, arguing that “this has to do with the American political 
system and the competition for funding within the armed forces, but it is also a reflection 
of who the main governmental Arctic actors are in the United States. Apart from the role 
played by the State of Alaska within the administration, it is mainly the Department of 
Defense.”220  
Conversely, the EU reiterated its Arctic position stating, “hard security, while 
important, should not be included on the agenda of either the Arctic Council or NATO. 
Instead, it should openly discuss rules and norms that support a peaceful, healthy, 
prosperous, and sustainable Arctic.”221 The EU relies on ESA and European Commission 
(EC) working through the Arctic Council to continue “dialogue and confidence building 
measures in existing frameworks.”222 ESA objectives within the Arctic include 
strengthening European cooperation in space research and applications, and developing 
competitive space technologies and industrial structures aimed at cost effectiveness for the 
purpose of scientific and operational space applications.223 While the focus areas and their 
organization members are different, the EU and the United States have separated their 
Arctic space collaboration into two lines of effort: space-based systems focused on science 
and environmental monitoring, and global climate change and space solutions to address 
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geopolitical and geoeconomic challenges within the region.224 The significant difference 
is the funding and focus the United States attributes to hard security issues within the 
region. 
Furthermore, European Arctic allies and partners cannot be visualized as a 
homogenous entity. Canadian interests within the Arctic differ from European Nordic 
interests and each Nordic nation has its own domestic priorities. Admiral James Stavridis, 
U.S. Navy, (ret), former NATO Supreme Allied Commander Europe, provided his 
perspective in 2017 on the Arctic states’ ability to collaborate, stating the Arctic states “will 
pursue their individual national agendas through both the European Union, in a NATO 
context, and via the offices of the Arctic Council.”225 He goes on to say that “Each of the 
European Arctic nations has a slightly different set of issues in the Arctic, and at the 
moment they show little sign of cooperating collectively to establish a European Arctic 
position on anything.”226 Further complicating the issue is that although ESA is the only 
research and development space agency of Europe, it is not the only space agency in Europe 
with Denmark, Finland, Norway, and Sweden all possessing national space programs 
(emphasis added).227 Harnessing this complex multinational and intergovernmental 
mosaic of Arctic allies and partners into a coherent, comprehensive cooperative strategy 
could be difficult. 
C. ANALYSIS 
The most challenging aspect of operating within the Arctic remains the brutal 
character of its climate and environmental challenges. The 2019 DOD Arctic Strategy 
describes the challenging operating conditions, stating, “The Arctic environment presents 
specific operational challenges that limit communications, including the harsh climate, vast 
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distances, and atmospheric phenomena.”228 Due to the combination of the Earth’s tilt and 
the Arctic’s location at the polar region, communications, remote-sensing, PNT, and multi-
domain awareness are limited due to a multitude of factors that have been studied by the 
scientific and technology community at length. Byers highlights that satellites and space 
ground infrastructure “are vital to Arctic communications, surveillance, navigation, search 
and rescue, weather forecasting, sea-ice monitoring, fishing, prospecting, and 
environmental research.”229 All the Arctic states have identified these issues as areas of 
strategic priority.230 However, literature on the challenges and rationales to achieve space 
collective action to address these issues is less understood.  
Based on part A, the Arctic region possesses all the design factors necessary to 
build space collaborative capacity. However, bold and active leadership within the defense 
and government sectors, formalized partnership agreements, and incorporating systems 
engineering principles to space network and system acquisitions and planning are needed 
to further develop space collective action within the region.231 The design factors 
presented within this section provides a framework for planners to understand better the 
rationales and opportunities of space collective action within the Arctic. Incorporating 
these principles into future implementation plans for space collaborative efforts could 
address U.S. strategic capability gaps and increase regional cohesion with international 
partners within the region. 
This chapter has sought to identify rationales and common barriers to building 
space collaborative capacity to better understand the challenges and opportunities that need 
to be addressed to achieve space collective action within the region. Part B of this chapter 
highlighted political, organizational, technological, economic, and cultural barriers that 
must be overcome to implement a cooperative space strategy for the Arctic. While these 
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challenges are significant, the United States has recognized shared interests amongst its 
Arctic allies and partners, has the organizational structure in place to formulate solutions, 
and has communicated its strategic capability gaps and desire for collaboration to build 
space collaborative capacity within the region. Creating future transparency and 
confidence-building measures for space activities assist in bringing allies and partners to 
the negotiating table to seek issues of mutual interests.  
The 2017 DOD International Space Cooperation Strategy reinforces this concept, 
stating “Cooperation cannot be left as an afterthought in planning U.S. national security 
space activities but must instead be integrated from the beginning into every aspect of space 
planning.”232 Incorporating U.S. space-based and space ground infrastructure within 
Arctic allied and partner space architectures provides system resiliency, redundancy, and 
deterrence if systems are integrated at the conception of programs rather than after 
implementation. The rationales and common barriers presented within this chapter 
highlight the necessity for the United States to lead space collective initiatives within the 
Arctic if it seeks to mobilize the necessary resources to achieve its objectives. No other 
Arctic state has the organizations, resources, and technology to create regional space 
collaboration without U.S. support.  
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IV. COMPARATIVE CASE STUDIES 
This chapter on Arctic allied and partner space activities provides two comparative 
case studies to assess the benefits to the United States of bilateral and regional space 
collective action within the Arctic. This chapter examines the space collaborative capacity 
of two spacefaring Arctic states: Norway and Denmark. Each country is analyzed in three 
parts, identified by a brief history of its space activity, motivations and key trends of its 
space programs, and areas of cooperation for building future space collaborative capacity 
in the Arctic. Additionally, NATO is assessed as a possible intergovernmental solution to 
building space collaborative capacity within the region. The lessons developed in this 
chapter for understanding Arctic allied and partner space collaborative capacity can be used 
for follow-on research and development of future space collaborative partnerships within 
the space domain.  
A. NORWAY  
 This section analyzes Norwegian space activities to provide context on how their 
niche space-based capabilities and services can contribute to a U.S. cooperative space 
strategy in the Arctic. Norway has had a strong and cooperative national security space 
relationship with the United States since the beginning of the Cold War. As a founding 
member of NATO and a strategic national security ally of the United States, the United 
States and Norway share a commitment as NATO allies to Arctic security. Due to 
Norway’s extensive history in space activities and its ideal geographical location in 
proximity to the Arctic, it serves as an ideal case study to assess the benefits for a 
formalized and comprehensive cooperative space strategy within the Arctic. 
1. Brief History of Norway’s Space Activity 
According to an ESA report on the history of Norwegian space activities, Norway’s 
space activities date back to the early 20th century. Due to Norway’s geographic location 
in the High North, Norwegian early scientific research focused primarily on polar 
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geophysical studies, including atmospheric, oceanic, and auroral studies.233 From its 
inception, Norway’s space activities included space collective action focused on 
Scandinavian, European, and transatlantic cooperation inclusive of the United States and 
Canada, in order to build space collaborative capacity.234 As early as 1917, the Norwegian 
town of Tromsø became a center for Norwegian space science research that continues 
today. Initial cooperation with the United States saw funding through the Rockefeller 
Foundation to support the opening of the Norwegian Institute for Cosmic Physics, in 
Tromsø in 1930 and the world’s first Institute of Theoretical Astrophysics (IFTA) in Oslo, 
Norway by 1934.235 
By January 1960, the Royal Norwegian Council for Scientific and Industrial 
Research (NTNF) established the Norwegian Space Research Committee.236 Creating a 
single national committee for space research provided an avenue for Norway to engage in 
space research cooperation with the United States. In a 1959 policy for space research 
collaboration, NASA declared that the United States would only cooperate internationally 
with countries possessing a “unified, civilian body responsible for the whole field of space 
research.”237 By August 1962, this transatlantic cooperation saw Norway launch its first 
sounding rocket from its Andøya Rocket Range (ARR), a launch sponsored and financed 
by the Norwegian Defense Research Establishment (NDRE), the NTNF, and the United 
States military and NASA.238 The ARR, in the northern part of Norway, provided Norway 
with a geostrategic advantage in its negotiations with the United States and its European 
counterparts to expand the scientific exploration of the auroral zone.239  
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The establishment of the ARR and the shift from scientific research to industrial 
space activities with military application saw the dissolution of the NTNF’s Space 
Research Committee and the standup of the Committee for Space Activity.240 Although 
Norway felt that scientific space research was still necessary, ESA historical records reflect 
that “the use and development of space technology for purposes other than scientific 
research had gained importance.”241 This trend continues today, with Norwegian space 
activities primarily focused on the industrial application of space technologies rather than 
significant national funding to scientific prestige initiatives. The 2013 Norwegian national 
space policy emphasized that, “Our strengths lie in certain industrial niches and in the 
application of space-based services…A small country must prioritise its resources, and 
there would be little point in attempting to create a major national space industry or to 
resolve to send Norwegian astronauts into space.”242  
The need for space-based surveillance in its newly proclaimed expanded maritime 
exclusionary economic zone altered the cooperative space structure within Norwegian 
space activities.243 Norway could no longer cooperate with the United States solely 
through bilateral negotiations while avoiding direct membership in cooperative European 
space organizations. Competition from ESA on negotiations with the United States for 
Landsat ground terminals pushed Norway into closer ties to its European partners, 
eventually leading to ESA membership in 1987.244 ESA records highlighted that it would 
take more than bilateral negotiations between the United States and Norway to establish a 
Landsat station in Norway as ESA entered negotiations with NASA that competed against 
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Norwegian interests.245 Realizing that it could no longer conduct bilateral negotiations 
with the United States without ESA competition, Norway’s space committees began to 
formalize relationships with ESA before full membership in the late 1980s. Norway could 
no longer abstain from European space organizations without potentially sidelining itself 
in future European partnerships or losing out to combined European space capabilities. 
Consequently, the Norwegian Space Centre (NSC) (now the Norwegian Space Agency 
(NOSA)) was established in 1987 in coordination with Norway’s ESA membership and 
“given the task of coordinating national space-related efforts, especially within the 
European arena.”246 
Additional space structural developments took place within the early 1990s and 
early 2000s with the creation of the Research Council of Norway (RCN) and several 
limited liability companies within the Norwegian space sector. Established in 1993, the 
RCN was a consolidation of Norway’s five research councils to concentrate national space 
policy initiatives.247 Norwegian space activities were privatized through limited liability 
companies. Some significant examples from ESA historical records include: the merger of 
ARR with the NSC in 1987 with Kongsberg Aero & Defence acquiring 10 percent 
ownership of the site; the merger of the Tromsø Satellite Station with the NSC in 1990; the 
establishment of EISCAT-Svalbard in 1994; the privatization of NTA with the creation of 
Telenor in 1995; and the construction and privatization of the Svalbard-satellite station 
(Svalsat) with the merger between Kongsberg Defence & Aerospace and the NSC to create 
Kongsberg Satellite Services AS (KSAT).248 These changes in Norwegian space structure 
were an effort to make the space scientific research infrastructure profitable while retaining 
national oversight. These changes would prove highly successful and form the modern 
space infrastructure for the Norwegian space industry.  
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2. Motivations and Key Trends 
According to Norway’s space policy from 2013, “most Norwegian space activities 
have been motivated by geographic factors. Norway is an elongated country, reaching far 
to the north, with a sea area more than six times larger than its land area.”249 The policy 
goes on to emphasize that, “the applied use of navigation, communication and earth 
observation satellites has been emphasized in addressing needs related to ship traffic, 
fisheries, agriculture, offshore petroleum and the public supervision of maritime 
activities.”250 Furthermore, its unique maritime energy activities have seen it play a 
leading role in space collaborative developments as well as international collaborative 
initiatives. Although Norway is a small country with a limited population size, it has an 
oversized effect due to its strong economic advantage through its high-tech industrial base 
and close security ties to NATO and the United States. 
Norway’s unique proximity to the polar region and its extensive maritime area of 
responsibility have significantly influenced its space activities and contributed to Norway 
as a gateway to the Arctic and the polar space above it. As highlighted in a comparative 
case study report of global space strategies from Bryce Space and Technology, “Given 
[Norway’s] geographic location, low population density, and activities in the maritime and 
offshore energy sectors, Norway is a natural consumer of space services.”251 Norway’s 
proximity to the polar region make it ideally suited for atmospheric observation, the hosting 
of space ground infrastructure, and serving as a launch location for polar-orbiting satellites. 
The Norwegian national space policy from 2013 further emphasized Norway’s unique 
geographical advantage, stating, “Since the 1960s, the geographical advantages of 
Norwegian-hosted ground infrastructure have been exploited to develop space activities 
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now regarded as world class in certain sector niches.”252 These geographical advantages 
and niche capabilities make Norway a strong candidate for additional space collective 
action with the United States to address space solutions in areas of mutual interests. 
ESA historical records highlight the industrial focus on Norwegian space activities 
stating, “Space activity, in a broad sense, has been economically profitable for Norway 
since 1987…It was pointed out that Norway probably had more space activities than most 
other countries similar in population size and national gross product, and that this would 
continue to be the case in the foreseeable future.”253 Records indicate that, “by the year 
2004, only the United States and France have had a higher turnover ratio per capita 
connected to space-related activities.”254 This is a remarkable accomplishment for a 
spacefaring nation with around 5.4 million inhabitants.255 
Norway sees itself as an emerging spacefaring nation that provides unique and 
complementary space capabilities to the High North and the Arctic.256 Additionally, 
according to Norwegian Ministry of Defence, it seeks to keep its space activities “as 
civilian as possible, as military as required,”257 in line with its political objective as an 
international leader in space cooperation and collaboration while supporting allied nations 
in the Arctic. Recognizing its small population size and geographical advantages in the 
High North, Norway space activities seek to be “a leading space nation in the Arctic,” while 
focusing space activities on what is “strategically important, operationally required, and 
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financially possible.”258 According to the U.S. Department of Commerce, “The 
Norwegian space industry is rather modest on an international scale, with an annual 
turnover of USD 893 million in a USD 423.8 billion global market (2019).”259 However, 
Norway’s geographical advantage in proximity to the polar region makes it an ideal 
location for space ground infrastructure and space science research. The U.S. Department 
of Commerce further highlights that, “Norway has a competitive advantage of being 
located such that the ground infrastructure is optimal for satellites. Svalbard is 
geographically uniquely placed in relation to reading data from polar orbiting 
satellites.”260 The report also highlights Norwegian market leaders in key space activities 
with Andøya Space Center (ASC) (orbital launch and research), Telenor 
(communications), Nammo, (propulsion systems), and the Kongsberg group (polar TT&C 
ground stations).261 
Norway has begun to expand its international presence in space policy forums, as 
it sees itself as a lead advocate for maintaining a conflict-free space domain. However, 
despite Norway’s extensive space history, it only recently became a member of the 
Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS) in 2017.262 During Norway’s 
first address to COPUOS in 2018, Norway outlined its space policy priorities, stating, 
“Norway’s space policy focuses on social benefits, industrial development, research and 
user needs. Through international cooperation and national initiatives, Norway aims to use 
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space for the benefit of sustainable development in the Arctic.”263 However, the 2013 
Norwegian space policy also highlights the Ministry of Defence’s extensive reliance on 
space and the need to continue to contribute to bilateral space cooperation with the United 
States. The space policy emphasizes that “the Norwegian Armed Forces, including the 
Coast Guard, use information gathered from earth observation, communications and 
navigation satellites. Their satellite data requirements are expected to become so extensive 
in the years ahead that they plan to acquire their own satellite capacity.”264 
The early part of the 21st century has witnessed Norwegian bilateral cooperation 
with key partners within the space domain. Recent Norwegian initiatives have seen space 
collaboration with the EU, ESA, Canada, Scandinavia, and the United States. The 
Norwegian space policy highlights Norwegian Armed Forces involvement in security 
agreements with the United States for access to the Global Positioning System’s (GPS) 
military applications as well as security programs associated with the Galileo project.265 
Additionally, according to an Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development 
(OECD) report from 2019, modern Norwegian space activities largely focus on “space 
manufacturing, satellite operations and downstream applications. Norwegian space 
manufacturing companies supply components, equipment and subsystems to several 
European satellites and launchers.”266 NOSA points out that, “there are more than 150 
satellites containing Norwegian technology in space.”267 The Norwegian focus on both 
industrially profitable space applications combined with its increasing reliance on space 
for defense will likely see Norwegian space activities attempt to exploit the dual use of 
space assets to the maximum extent. As reinforced by its space policy, “the United States 
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has been and remains Norway’s most important partner in space.”268 Norway’s extensive 
space experience and its close ties to the United States and NATO will likely see bilateral 
space cooperation initiatives continue. 
3. Areas of Cooperation 
Norway has cooperated with the United States since the early 20th century from 
scientific collaboration to bilateral defense agreements. As a founding member of NATO 
and a key U.S. security partner within the Arctic, Norway could be the gateway to building 
a cooperative space strategy for the Arctic. Norway’s recent long-term defense strategy 
from 2020 emphasizes, “Due to our geostrategic location, Norway has considerable 
responsibility at the northern flank of the Alliance. To meet this responsibility, Norway 
must maintain a present national military force, as well as significant surveillance and 
intelligence resources.”269 This regional-focused message communicated directly towards 
U.S. strategic capability gaps within the Arctic is likely no accident, as Norway continues 
to advocate for additional NATO and U.S. involvement in the Arctic. The following 
mission areas can be identified as areas of cooperation between Norway and the United 
States to build space collaborative capacity within the region. 
a. Communications 
Since the 1960s, Norwegian space activities have focused on improving maritime 
communications within the Arctic, due to Norway’s extensive maritime shipping fleet. In 
1968, Norwegian space activities would reach what an ESA report termed a “decisive 
turning point.”270 The end of the 1960s witnessed the Norwegian space efforts to 
industrialize telecommunications, focused on maritime communications. According to 
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ESA records, this would see Norway “strongly set out in the direction of defining 
telecommunication as the chief priority of the Norwegian space effort.”271 This was 
primarily due to Norway’s extensive merchant fleet, which accounted for nearly 10 percent 
of the world’s shipping capacity, and the significant contributions of Norwegian industry 
in maritime communication equipment.272 Space solutions were seen as a possible service 
to address the growing needs of the maritime industry that garnered Norwegian scientific, 
military, and commercial sector support.  
By 1979, the Norwegian Telecommunication Administration (NTA) became one 
of the most significant contributors to the International Maritime Satellite Organization 
(Inmarsat). According to ESA records, of the 40 initial countries investing in the 
consortium, “Norway was the fourth largest investor in Inmarsat, with a share equivalent 
to its proportion of the world merchant fleet.”273 Additionally, according to an official 
press release from the Norwegian government, “Norway was actually the first country to 
utilise satellites for inland communication, particularly for the oil installation (sic) in the 
North Sea and for the Svalbard archipelago in the Arctic.”274 The focus of Norwegian 
space activities on high-latitude communications continues today as a viable area of mutual 
interest to build space cooperation between the United States and Norway. 
Norway is the leading satellite communications provider within the Nordic 
countries specializing in broadband and maritime communications.275 Throughout its 
recent history, due to its location in the High North, Norway has relied on satellite 
communications. According to NOSA, “Satellite communication accounts for about 70% 
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of Norwegian space-related turnover.”276 In May 2021, Norway has four commercial 
communications satellites in geostationary orbit with an additional three satellites 
decommissioned in their graveyard orbit.277 These commercial satellites include the Thor 
series of satellites from the commercial telecommunications provider Telenor, which is one 
of Norway’s largest companies and a world leader in telecommunications focused on 
broadcast coverage of Scandinavia, Eastern Europe, and the Asian market.278 Telenor was 
one of the largest shareholders of Inmarsat prior to its recent sale, and remains the fourth 
largest shareholder in Intelsat, both of which are leading high latitude satellite 
communications companies.279 Data from the United Nations Office for Outer Space 
Affairs (UNOOSA) confirms that Thor satellites 1–3 are currently in their disposal or 
graveyard orbits with Thor 4–7 in geostationary orbit providing coverage of Scandinavia 
and the maritime corridors over the North Sea, Norwegian Sea, Baltic Sea, and the North 
Atlantic amongst other areas.280  
Although its current constellation of commercial communications satellites resides 
in geosynchronous earth orbit (GEO), Norway is currently developing an Arctic highly 
elliptical orbit (HEO) high-speed broadband communications system that will service 
higher latitudes within the Arctic. According to Space Norway, which is a limited liability 
company owned by the Norwegian government, “Space Norway will cooperate with the 
satellite operator Inmarsat and the Norwegian Ministry of Defence to offer mobile 
broadband coverage to civilian and military users in the Arctic.”281 It is advertised that, 
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“each of the two satellites will carry multiple payloads, and the system is scheduled to be 
operational for at least 15 years with users able to switch between current geostationary 
satellites and the HEO satellites.”282 The projected launch date is in late 2022 with full 
coverage over the Arctic from 65 degrees North.283 
Additionally, the HEO satellites are being developed in collaboration with the 
United States and as part of the U.S. Air Force’s enhanced polar system (EPS) military 
satellite project. In July 2019, Northrop Grumman announced that the “two Norwegian 
satellites will host the core components of the U.S. Air Force’s next generation satellite 
communications system for the Arctic.”284  A GAO report from 2018, estimated that the 
recapitalization payload could save the Air Force an estimated “$900 million over free-
flying satellites.”285 Additional reports highlights that the enhanced polar system 
recapitalization (EPS-R) payload program “will include two eXtended Data Rate (XDR) 
payloads and will fill a Protected SATCOM coverage gap in the North Polar Region until 
the Protected Tactical SATCOM and Evolved Strategic SATCOM polar variants are 
available in the 2030s (sic).”286 The GAO report emphasized that “this mission may be 
particularly important as it marks the first DOD payload intended for operational use on a 
commercial host.”287 This space collaboration initiative is witnessing bilateral partnership 
in a public-private commercial venture to address shared strategic challenges within the 
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Arctic. Other Arctic allies have taken note, with the Canadian Armed Forces also 
potentially investing in the services.288  
Furthermore, Norwegian commercial nanosatellite provider GomSpace was 
awarded a contract by the Norwegian Defence Research Establishment (FFI) in June 2020 
“to develop and deliver a military communications nanosatellite…The satellite is meant to 
demonstrate military tactical communications on the Ultra High Frequency (UHF) band 
from a polar Low-Earth Orbit (LEO).”289 According to GomSpace, “the primary mission 
objective is to demonstrate the military use and relevance of an Arctic satellite relay for 
tactical communication radios.”290 This emerging capability continues to leverage 
Norwegian expertise in low budget, high-technology space solutions that have the potential 
to address national Arctic challenges.  
b. Launch Facilities 
The Andøya Rocket Range (ARR) played a pivotal role in expanding Norway’s 
international space activities across its three cooperative arenas of Scandinavian, European, 
and transatlantic partnerships. According to official ESA historical documents, Norway 
decided not to join the European Launcher Development Organisation (ELDO) in 1961 or 
the European Space Research Organisation (ESRO) in 1962, as it “was neither convinced 
of the industrial benefits of ESRO nor of the necessity for Norwegian scientists to join the 
organization.”291 However, ESA reports confirmed that Norwegian space scientists and 
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researchers believed that “a launch site in northern Norway, easily accessible in the auroral 
zone, would make Norway an attractive ally for foreign scientists,” including European 
partners and the United States.292 By 1965, the European Space and Sounding Rocket 
Range (Esrange) Special Project (ESP) was established through negotiations “between the 
Swedish Space Corporation, NDRE, the NTNF Space activity division and ESRO.”293 The 
ESP leveraged the geographical advantage of Norway and Sweden’s Andøya and Esrange 
(Kiruna, Sweden) launch facilities. The ESP established a regional space cooperative 
agreement between European partners, stating, “ESRO Member States would have access 
to Esrange and Andøya. It was acknowledged that the two launch sites supplemented each 
other; Andøya being better suited for certain experiments than Esrange.”294 This 
agreement continues today as the Esrange Andøya Special Project (EASP) within ESA, 
with participation from France, Germany, Norway, Sweden, and Switzerland.295  
Additionally, the ARR played a significant role in Norway’s bilateral collaboration 
with the United States. According to ESA historical reports, by 1975, “Andøya became 
one of the most frequently used launch sites under the NASA international 
programme...representing nearly 10 percent of the sounding rockets launched outside of 
North America.”296 Today, this trend continues with NOSA advertising that Andøya 
remains “NASA’s most important launch facility for sounding rockets outside USA.”297 
A Norwegian government report confirms, “more than 1000 research rockets have been 
launched from the range” since 1962.298  
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After going through several modernization upgrades throughout the years and 
several name changes, the Andøya Space Center or Andøya Space is now advertised as an 
orbital launch facility for small satellites into polar and sun-synchronous orbits at launch 
inclinations ranging from 87.4 to 108 degrees.299 Although the Andøya Space Center or 
Andøya Spaceport hasn’t achieved orbital launch as of May 2021, in 2018 the Norwegian 
commercial company Nammo did achieve an altitude of 104 km.300 This was an important 
achievement as it “was the first sounding rocket fully developed and built in Norway by 
the Norwegian company Nammo in partnership with the Norwegian Space Agency and 
ESA.”301 Nammo’s propulsion system is a hybrid motor rocket combining liquid and solid 
propellant that uses a non-toxic fuel with a non-explosive solid which lowers cost and 
increases safety in handling and manufacturing.302 This is yet another example of 
Norwegian space activities providing low-cost solutions to address regional needs. 
Although the United States possesses abundant launch sites to include a polar launch 
facility at the Pacific Spaceport Complex in Kodiak, Alaska, incorporating Norwegian 
launch sites could build space collaborative capacity into an overall allied launch 
network.303  
c. Arctic Awareness 
The 1970s witnessed Norwegian satellite surveillance and remote-sensing 
investment and collaboration with European and North American partners. Norway 
partnered with the United States on the Landsat 1 and 2 experiments and upgraded the 
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facilities of the Tromsø Telemetry Station to facilitate imaging download.304 These newly 
funded and promoted space solutions benefited the Norwegian industry and the military 
services. Additionally, the significant expansion of territorial waters in the late 1970s from 
the recognized 200-mile economic zone at sea created a national capability required to 
provide monitoring and surveillance of vast natural resources, including fishing, oil, and 
gas. According to Norwegian space records, this was best achieved through space-based 
solutions, especially synthetic aperture radar (SAR).305 ESA historical reports emphasized 
that “for the first time, space activity was linked to important overall government policy 
considerations.”306 These space-based solutions addressed the need for “surveillance of 
Norway’s territorial waters, and of the oil and fishing activity off the Norwegian coast.”307 
Although Norway has historically been a consumer of space-based earth observation assets 
while primarily engaged in telemetry, tracking, and command (TT&C) activities of polar 
satellites, recent technological advancements in small satellite development have provided 
an avenue for national programs. These programs offer another opportunity for bilateral 
cooperation between the United States and Norway to address regional challenges of 
mutual interests. 
As a nation with substantial maritime activities in fishing, oil and gas, and shipping, 
Norway has a defense and civil obligation to support maritime awareness and contribute to 
navigation solutions within the Arctic. The 2013 Norwegian national space policy 
highlighted that “the launch of AISSat-1 in 2010 showed that the Norwegian authorities, 
with modest effort, are able to finance and operate highly effective space infrastructure at 
the national level.”308 As of May 2021, Norway now has five maritime monitoring 
satellites in orbit with AISSat-1 and AISSat-2 along with NorSats 1, 2, and 3. According 
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to NOSA, the AISSat series of small satellites “monitor maritime traffic in Norwegian and 
international waters by detecting AIS (Automatic Identification Signals) from ships to 
determine their position, speed and direction.”309 Although they were intended as 
demonstration and research satellites, the AISSat series proved so successful that they 
continue to provide daily monitoring of maritime traffic within the Arctic region.310  
Additionally, the NorSat 1 and 2 series of satellites that launched in July 2017 are 
slightly larger satellites but still classified as microsatellites.311 According to NOSA, 
NorSat 1 and 2 successfully achieved two-way communication through the VHS Data 
Exchange System (VDES), which provided the capability to send “data such as sea ice 
maps and emergency messages over the AIS system.”312 The newest NorSat 3 was 
launched in April 2021. According to a press release from Space Flight Laboratory which 
built the satellite, the NorSat-3 carries two payloads with one being the AIS receiver and 
the other “equipped with an experimental navigation radar detector developed by the 
Norwegian Defence Research Establishment (FFI) to augment the AIS receiver.”313 
Combining both receivers should provide improved maritime awareness data. These 
advancements in maritime domain awareness and navigation within the Arctic have the 
potential to contribute to a common allied operational picture within the Arctic maritime 
domain. 
A recent Norwegian Defence Research Establishment (FFI)314 report from 2020 
emphasized the need for Norway to develop space-based surveillance assets and 
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autonomous long-range drones to improve its situational awareness over key areas of 
interest. The report stated, “For a small country like Norway with large marine areas to 
monitor, the development of low-orbit satellites and autonomous sensor-equipped drones 
with a long-range and endurance are of particular interest.”315 As Norway’s armed forces 
attempt to increase their technological capabilities and capacity within these key areas, the 
United States can play a role in stimulating technological growth through collaboration and 
cooperation of mutual areas of interest. A technologically advanced Norwegian military 
with a comprehensive multi-domain surveillance architecture reinforces NATO’s northern 
flank and provides a critical capability within the region. The advancements at the Andøya 
Space Center and Norwegian small satellites on orbit contribute to reducing this gap, but 
further partnership in high resolution imagery over key maritime areas of interests is still 
needed. 
d. Space Situational Awareness 
Norwegian space activities have contributed to the space surveillance mission since 
the 1950s.316 Due to Norway’s geographical advantage near the polar region, Norway is 
well suited for the space surveillance mission, as it can cover both geosynchronous and 
polar orbits. Today, Norway is a participating member of ESA’s SSA Programme and 
maintains close ties to the United States and the international community through its 
Globus space surveillance and radar facility in Vardø, Norway, and through its 
participation in the European Incoherent Scatter Scientific Association (EISCAT) radar 
systems located in Tromsø and Svalbard, Norway.317 Like most of Norway’s space 
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activities, Norwegian space surveillance initiatives are not funded solely through national 
means, but are supported through bilateral or multilateral space collaboration.  
In 2017, the Norwegian Ministry of Defence and Norwegian Ministry of Trade, 
Industry, and Fisheries (NOSA is a government agency under this ministry) signed a data-
sharing agreement with USSTRATCOM (agreement now resides under USSPACECOM) 
to share SSA data and services.318 At the time, Maj. Gen. Odd-Harald Hagen, Head of the 
Department of Defence Policy and Long-Term Planning from the Norwegian Ministry of 
Defence, stated, “This situational space awareness memorandum of understanding is an 
important milestone for Norway’s development as an active and responsible space nation 
in the High North and Arctic.”319 Furthermore, the data-sharing agreement highlights the 
continued cooperation with the United States in space surveillance activities that began in 
the 1950s and continues to grow due to the increasing importance of space domain 
awareness. 
The Globus II facility is run by the Norwegian Intelligence Service (NIS) in 
cooperation with the United States. Established in 1997, the GLOBUS II space surveillance 
and radar facility is responsible for monitoring, tracking, and cataloguing objects out to 
geosynchronous orbit as well as strengthening “the ability of the Norwegian Defence 
Intelligence service to monitor the Norwegian area of military interest.”320 According to 
the U.S. Air Force, GLOBUS II is “a radar system located at Vardø, Norway, that is 
operated solely by Norwegian personnel, but which was developed by the United States 
and serves as part of the 29-sensor, global space surveillance network [SSN] that provides 
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data to the [USSPACECOM].”321 Furthermore, Norwegian Ministry of Defence officials 
confirmed,  
The radar is the only one of its kind in the world. It is an X-band (10 GHz), 
high resolution, single narrow beam, 200 Kw peak radiated power radar. It 
has a mechanically steered, parabolic reflector antenna of center-feed type, 
27 meters in diameter and housed in a 35-meter diameter radome. [It] is 
mounted on a rotating pedestal and can track objects to geosynchronous 
altitude, about 41 000 kilometers.322 
These specifications make the Globus II radar facility one of the most exquisite in 
the world. However, the radar site has come under intense scrutiny within Europe and 
Russia for its potential military applications as well as its close proximity to the Russian 
border as it is less than 40 miles from Russia’s Kola Peninsula.323 Open-source intelligence 
analysts report that Russian claims “that the GLOBUS II radar is also capable of providing 
key telemetry for the U.S. ballistic missile defense (BMD) program, including targeting 
data for Aegis-capable destroyers.”324 Consequently, the Russians clearly see the 
GLOBUS II radar system as a threat. In February 2018, the Director of NIS reported that 
“eleven Russian Su-24 tactical bombers conducted a simulated air attack on a GLOBUS II 
radar station.”325 Although these simulated bombing attacks by Russia indicate clear intent 
that the Globus radar site is a military target, the Norwegian Ministry of Defence “stressed 
that the radar is not to be part of any eventual U.S. missile defence…and the agreement 
between Norway and the United States specifies totally different tasks for the radar.”326 
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Moreover an FFI report from 2020, emphasized that “the Armed Forces currently have no 
sensors capable of detecting incoming ballistic missiles and no missiles capable of 
intercepting ballistic missiles.”327  
Additionally, Norway contributes to the EISCAT Scientific Association, which is 
“an international organization funded and operated by research councils from Norway, 
Sweden, Finland, Japan, China and the UK.”328 Established in 1975, EISCAT operates 
four of the ten incoherent scatter radars in the world.329 The EISCAT Scientific 
Association is responsible for ionospheric and lower, middle, and upper atmospheric 
measurements for research in space weather, space debris, and the aurora borealis.330 
Norway contributes two of the four sites located north of the Arctic circle, with sites in 
Tromsø, Norway and in Longyearbyen, Svalbard.331 These sites partner through EISCAT 
with ESA’s SSA Programme to contribute to not only scientific space research but also to 
building SSA collaborative capacity within Europe.332 As the United States also shares a 
SSA data-sharing agreement with ESA,333 the EISCAT program is another avenue for 
bilateral and regional cooperation to build space collaborative capacity within the Arctic. 
Furthermore, the Norwegian Ministry of Defence’s long-term defense strategy, with a 
focus on “high-tech and forward-looking defense,” highlighted that “the Government will 
establish a common space situation picture at the national level with military, civilian and 
commercial actors. In this context, the Armed Forces shall contribute to the development 
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and establishment of national capacity for the SSA.”334 Based on the evidence within this 
section, it is clear that the United States and Norway have extensive bilateral cooperation 
within the space surveillance mission, which provides an avenue for further cooperation in 
additional space collaboration initiatives. 
e. Space Ground Infrastructure 
In 1965, the NTNF, in collaboration with ESRO, established a critical piece of 
space ground infrastructure with the establishment and operation of a satellite station on 
Svalbard at Spitsbergen.335 Additionally, in 1966 the NDRE, in collaboration with the 
United States and Canada, established the Tromsø telemetry station to support the 
International Satellite for Ionospheric Studies (ISIS) program.336 ESA historical records 
state, “Development of the satellite stations in Ny-Ålesund [Spitsbergen] and Tromsø 
considerably enlarged the scope of Norwegian space-related scientific activity, as did the 
expansion of scientific work at the Auroral Observatory in Tromsø.”337 Although both 
sites supported scientific research, both were also considered dual-use for military 
purposes. Historical records confirm that “The Soviets alleged that the ESRO station was, 
in fact, a camouflaged espionage centre, with the aim of serving NATO surveillance 
satellites and possibly also military air traffic.”338 These political barriers continue today, 
with Norwegian telemetry stations often receiving adverse reactions from Russian leaders 
due to their dual-use nature and proximity. However, the establishment of both sites further 
exemplified Norway’s ability to leverage space cooperative agreements between North 
American and European partners. These initial programs established the foundation for the 
advanced space ground infrastructure at both sites today. 
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Norway’s proximity to the polar region provides it a geographical advantage for 
making observations of the polar region as well as transmitting and receiving satellite data 
from satellites in polar orbits. According to the 2019 Norwegian space strategy, “Norway 
has multiple satellite ground stations, including in Svalbard, on Jan Mayen Island and in 
Dronning Maud Land.”339 Although Dronning Maud Land is in Antarctica and not the 
Arctic, Norway enjoys the distinction and significant astrostrategic advantage of 
possessing satellite ground stations at both poles of the Earth.340  However, an ESA report 
emphasizes the astrostrategic significance of Svalbard in particular, stating, “even more 
ideal is the position of Svalbard, halfway between the Norwegian mainland and the North 
Pole, and blessed with the most favourable (sic) climate of all sites on the same 
latitude.”341 Admiral James Stavridis, former NATO Supreme Allied Commander Europe, 
further highlighted the strategic importance of Svalbard stating, “The Norwegian island of 
Svalbard, high up in the Arctic Ocean, dominates the Barents Sea and constitutes a 
significant thorn in the side of Russian ambitions in the region.”342  
The Svalbard satellite (SvalSat) station on Svalbard possesses the largest ground 
station in the world for monitoring polar orbits.343 ESA records highlight that the SvalSat 
station “is an important part of the ground infrastructure for NASA and EUMETSAT, in 
addition to ESA Earth observation missions and for the Galileo and Copernicus satellites 
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being launched by ESA in agreement with the European Commission.”344 As the largest 
commercial ground station for distributing TT&C data to and from polar satellites, the 
SvalSat station is of critical importance to both United States and European space 
initiatives. The SvalSat ground station receives updates from every polar orbiting satellite, 
with 14 passes over the ground station each day.345 However, a recent security review 
from the Heritage Foundation in 2020 emphasizes the space security concerns related to 
Svalbard, stating, “the geostrategic location of Svalbard, especially in terms of its 
proximity to the Kola Peninsula, home of Russia’s Northern Fleet, is not lost on the 
Russians.”346 Svalbard’s geopolitical situation is unique within the Arctic due to the 
Spitsbergen Treaty from 1920, which prevents a permanent Norwegian military presence 
on the island.347 This creates a challenging security dilemma for Norway and the United 
States, as essential space ground infrastructure is left undefended.  
B. KINGDOM OF DENMARK 
The Kingdom of Denmark inclusive of Denmark, Greenland, and the Faroe Islands 
is centrally located in the Arctic due to its vast land areas in Greenland northeast of the 
North American continent. Similar to Norway within the previous section, the Kingdom of 
Denmark is also a founding member of NATO and a strategic national security ally of the 
United States with a shared commitment to Arctic security. The Kingdom of Denmark is 
analyzed as a comparative case study instead of Canada, Finland, Iceland, or Sweden due 
to its comparable cooperation in space activities to Norway as well as its significant history 
of national space security cooperation with the United States. Unlike Canada, which also 
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has a significant history in national security space cooperation with the United States, 
Norway and Denmark’ space activities are on a much smaller financial scale. However, as 
highlighted by Gleason and Weeden and demonstrated by the research within the chapter, 
“smaller countries, with fewer capabilities and resources, still make significant 
contributions to a coalition by bolstering deterrence, supplying information, providing 
geographic advantage, and enhancing the international legitimacy of U.S. actions.”348 This 
section analyzes Danish space activities to provide a comparative case study on how 
Norwegian and Danish space activities can contribute to a U.S. cooperative space strategy 
in the Arctic. 
1. Brief History of Denmark’s Space Activity 
 Denmark has been involved in space activities since the late 19th century, with its 
scientific research on the Earth’s magnetic field, the ionosphere, and the aurora borealis 
due to its geographic location in northern Europe.349 The post-World War II era witnessed 
Danish participation in European space collaboration initiatives, with extensive bilateral 
and regional Scandinavian cooperation with Norway and Sweden at their respective launch 
sites at Andøya and Kiruna, and the scientific community at the Danish Ionosphere 
Laboratory at the Technical University of Denmark (DTU).350 As a founding member of 
the NATO alliance in 1949, the Kingdom of Denmark and the United States have a long 
history of security cooperation in space activities that will be discussed in greater detail in 
the following sections.351 This relationship has seen Denmark’s space activities largely 
separated between its industrial and scientific space activities through its European partners 
within the EU and ESA, and its defense space activities through its NATO and bilateral 
agreements with the United States. 
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Denmark’s European space activities formally began in 1964 with its participation 
in regional space collaborative initiatives when it joined the ESRO; it eventually became a 
founding member of ESA in 1975.352 As a founding member, Denmark has contributed to 
numerous scientific and economic European space initiatives since joining the international 
organization.353 The Danish Space Research Institute (DSRI) was established in 1966. 
Since then, almost all Danish space research was conducted by or in coordination with 
DSRI through the early 2000s.354 Early research predominantly included Earth 
Observation through the monitoring of sea and land ice in the Arctic, the design of sounding 
rocket payloads, and development and manufacturing of instruments and measurement 
systems for satellites.355 European space policy experts have described Denmark’s 
contributions to space collaborative initiatives as having an outsized impact. The chairman 
of the DSRI in an interview in 1979 stated, “the Danish contribution to ESA space 
programme is about 2% but it is not exaggerated when we claim that our part of the 
European space experiments is almost three times as valuable.”356 This claim extends into 
today as the Space Generation Advisory Council emphasized, “compared to its size, 
Denmark has a strong presence among the space faring nations…from design and delivery 
of spacecraft components through universities and private companies, to the first Danish 
astronaut Andreas Mogensen, who flew on the International Space Station in 2015.”357  
In 2007, the National Space Institute (NSI) at DTU, known as DTU Space, was 
formed through the merger of the Danish National Space Center (DNSC) and various 
research groups within Denmark, to include DSRI, the Danish Meteorological Institute, 
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and the Defence Research Establishment.358 Relatively recent Danish space 
accomplishments include the first Danish research satellite Ørsted in 1999, development 
of star trackers for NASA’s Juno mission, manufacturing components and sensors for 
ESA’s ASIM-mission in 2018, and designing cameras for NASA’s Mars rover mission in 
2020.359 Denmark collaboratively published its first national space strategy in 2016 
between its various governmental ministries, to include its Ministry of Defence and 
Ministry of Higher Education and Science.360 According to the 2016 Danish National 
Space Strategy, “Danish businesses are typically strong in various niche areas such as 
power control technologies, nanosatellites, software simulation systems, use of Earth 
observation data, electronic components, star trackers and terminals for receiving satellite 
signals.”361 Denmark’s estimated space budget for ESA activities and programs in 2021 is 
approximately 40 million dollars accounting for 0.7 percent of ESA budget.362 As of May 
2021, it is unknown the current Danish national space budget, but historical records 
indicate ESA activities account for approximately 90 percent of the total Danish space 
budget.363 
2. Motivations and Key Trends 
As a self-described “major Arctic power,” the Kingdom of Denmark inclusive of 
Denmark, Greenland, and the Faroe Islands has a significant role in Arctic affairs due to 
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Greenland and the Faroe Islands’ geostrategic locations within the Arctic region.364 
Greenland is the world’s largest island and lies along the transpolar route between the polar 
great powers of the United States and Russia. Similarly, the Faroe Islands are located along 
a strategic maritime corridor between Iceland and the United Kingdom (UK). Magnus 
Nordenman, an expert on NATO and security in Northern Europe, emphasized the 
Kingdom of Denmark’s geostrategic importance to NATO and U.S. security in the Arctic 
stating, “Denmark is a founding member of NATO and played a vital role on NATO’s 
northern flank during the Cold War due to its geographical location.”365  
The reemerging Russian security threat is refocusing allied and partner efforts 
within the Arctic, and Denmark is responding accordingly. Although Denmark seeks to 
avoid the militarization of the Arctic and promote international cooperation within the 
region, its recent Arctic strategy highlights its responsibility to exercise sovereignty and 
surveillance of the region. The strategy states, “While the Kingdom’s area in the Arctic is 
covered by the NATO treaty Article 5 regarding collective defence, the enforcement of 
sovereignty is fundamentally a responsibility of the Realm’s central authorities. 
Enforcement of sovereignty is exercised by the armed forces through a visible presence in 
the region where surveillance is central to the task.”366  
However, the 2016 Danish space strategy highlighted current Danish challenges 
within the Arctic, stating, “the Arctic is one such area in which a lack of satellite coverage 
makes it difficult for the defence forces to perform their duties.”367 The strategy 
 
364 Peter Taksøe-Jensen, “Executive Summary: Danish Diplomacy and Defence in Times of Change: 
A review of Denmark’s Foreign and Security Policy” (Copenhagen, DK: Ministry of Foreign Affairs of 
Denmark, 2016), 5, https://um.dk/en/foreign-policy/danish-defence-and-diplomacy-in-times-of-change/. 
365 Magnus Nordenman, “The US-Danish Defense and Security Relationship: Keeping Up in a 
Changing World,” Atlantic Council: Snowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, last modified February 
12, 2019, 2, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/issue-brief/the-us-danish-defense-
and-security-relationship-2/. 
366 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark, Denmark, Greenland and the Faroe Islands: Kingdom of 
Denmark Strategy for the Arctic 2011–2020 (Copenhagen, DK: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2011), 20, 
https://um.dk/en/foreign-policy/the-arctic/. 
367 Danish Ministry of Higher Education and Science, Denmark’s National Space Strategy: Growth 
Through Strengthened Cooperation, 16. 
99 
emphasizes the need for Denmark to engage in space collaborative initiatives with partners 
to address these challenges stating, “there is potential for increased cooperation with other 
Arctic nations such as Canada, the U.S. and Norway.”368 The strategy concludes that future 
Danish space priorities within the Arctic should, “investigate the possibilities for a public-
private partnership to develop a satellite-based solution for communication in the 
Arctic…[and] strengthen coordination between emergency services and defence forces to 
ensure rapid and efficient data sharing in the form of a cooperation agreement.”369 
Denmark also plans to leverage its extensive participation in both the Galileo and 
Copernicus programs to expand its capability in navigation and remote-sensing services 
within the Arctic region.  
Additionally, a Danish security review from 2016 concluded, “Denmark should 
explore possible satellite-based solutions to strengthen communication and surveillance in 
the Arctic…In light of the increased military presence and activity level in the Arctic, it 
should be explored whether there is support for a discussion forum on security policy 
related to the Arctic.”370 Nordenman’s recommendations align with this sentiment when 
he concludes, “Washington and Copenhagen should continue to explore appropriate roles 
for Denmark, in concert with the UK, Norway, Iceland, and Canada in the emerging new 
Alliance posture in the North Atlantic.”371 Although this recommendation does not align 
with a cooperative space strategy specific to the Arctic states proposed within this thesis, 
it does provide evidence to the sentiment and need for a cooperative space strategy specific 
to the region.  
Furthermore, the security review highlights Denmark’s unique position to promote 
regional and international cooperation, stating, “Denmark’s membership to the EU, NATO 
and the UN thus constitutes the foundation for promoting Danish interests 
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internationally.”372 It goes on to state, “Denmark has major advantages of binding 
international cooperation and rules which ensure a level playing field, influence of smaller 
countries and promote multilateral solutions. International challenges require international 
solutions.”373 In May 2021, Secretary of State, Antony Blinken emphasized Denmark’s 
strategic importance in building regional collaboration amongst not only the Arctic states, 
but globally due its memberships in key institutions, stating, “As the only country that 
belongs to NATO, the European Union, and the Arctic Council, Denmark consistently 
plays a leadership role in regional and global affairs.”374 This sentiment reinforces Danish 
space collaborative capacity to engage with allies and partners within the region and 
highlights Danish tendency to engage in multilateralism to address shared challenges.  
Although Danish space activities have been almost entirely focused on scientific 
accomplishments and industrial support to space component manufacturing, recent 
advances in space technology have seen Danish space activities shift to national solutions 
to address emerging Arctic-related challenges. The 2016 Danish National Space Strategy 
emphasizes, “due to the rapid pace of technological change the exploitation of space is now 
possible by means of small satellites, which allows even small countries like Denmark to 
participate.”375 The strategy goes on to highlight, “The Ministry of Defence’s requirement 
for surveillance data is being met by a large number of suppliers, non-military as well as 
military, through cooperation agreements and through procurement of data for use in vessel 
traffic monitoring.”376 This mix of public-private partnerships, international collaboration, 
and bilateral partnerships with the United States and other NATO allies could likely 
contribute to addressing U.S. strategic capability gaps within the region. 
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3. Areas of Cooperation 
Denmark and the United States have cooperated in space activities since the 
beginning of the space age. As a founding member of NATO and a key U.S. security 
partner with significant global relationships, Denmark’s emerging capability in the space 
sector could prove consequential for future space collaboration within the Arctic. The 
following mission areas can be identified as areas of cooperation between the United States 
and the Kingdom of Denmark.  
a. Arctic Awareness 
Due to the changing geostrategic environment and the emerging challenges within 
the region, the Danish Defence Agreement 2010–2014 recognized the need for a more 
robust Danish Armed Forces presence within the Arctic. In an effort to streamline and 
establish unity of command amongst its various territorial aligned commands, the Defence 
Agreement concluded, “the Greenland Command and the Faroe Command are to be 
combined into a joint service Arctic Command.”377 Recently established in October 2012, 
and headquartered in Nuuk, Greenland, the mission of Denmark’s Joint Arctic Command 
(JACO) is “to protect the sovereignty of the Kingdom of Denmark in the Arctic 
Region.”378 As a joint operational territorial command, JACO’s main tasks are to provide 
for the defense and maintain all-domain awareness of Danish sovereign territory in 
Greenland and the Faroe Islands.379 Due to the geographic location and enormous size of 
the island of Greenland within the Arctic region and the geostrategic location of the Faroe 
Islands along the strategic maritime corridor, JACO includes geostrategic areas of 
importance for not only Denmark, but the United States and the NATO alliance.  
These strategic relationships have seen recent strategic engagement between JACO 
and both the United States and NATO. In September 2020, the United States and NATO 
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reestablished NATO’s Atlantic Command in Norfolk, Virginia, with the mission to 
maintain situational awareness and conduct operations in the North Atlantic and the 
Arctic.380 Additionally, in October 2020, a statement from NATO read, “as part of 
strengthening its Arctic cooperation, NATO’s Maritime Command (MARCOM) has 
established a new operational coordination arrangement with the Danish Joint Arctic 
Command (JACO) in Greenland.”381 Vice Admiral Keith Blount, Commander of 
MARCOM stated, “Over the past years we have seen an increasing maritime interest in the 
Arctic region. I anticipate that MARCOM and JACO will greatly benefit from working 
together on an operational level under this new agreement.”382 The NATO public affairs 
office further highlights, “the enhanced cooperation will include monthly coordination 
meetings, exchange of surveillance information, and participation in exercises, among 
other activities.”383 This restructuring of NATO commands and Danish defense 
commands reinforces the already strong international relationships between Arctic allies 
and partners and should benefit situational awareness within the region going forward. 
The Danish Defence Agreement 2010–2014 further directed what it called “an 
analysis of whether or not advantages exist in entering into closer cooperation with other 
Nordic countries, the USA, Canada, Russia and the UK regarding surveillance and other 
similar tasks.”384 Although this proposed surveillance collaboration includes Russia as a 
potential partner, it should be noted that this strategy was published prior to the 2014 
Russian invasion of Crimea, which significantly altered the geopolitical reality within the 
Arctic region. It also should be noted that Denmark’s defense agreement divides tasks 
within the Arctic into national and international tasks. It identifies national tasks as search 
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and rescue, environmental monitoring, and emergency services, which all still garner 
significant cooperation amongst the Arctic states regardless of external tensions.385 
Additionally, this separation in focus of tasks within the region highlights the dual-use 
capability of space cooperative initiatives as space capabilities have the potential to address 
both areas of concern. An example of this is Russian cooperation in the search and rescue 
mission utilizing its Artika satellites that contribute to both surveillance and environmental 
monitoring mission areas within the Arctic.386 
An analysis by Jacob Gronholt-Pedersen for Reuters highlighted the immense 
awareness challenges Denmark faces within the Arctic. He states, “Today, to monitor its 
vast area, Greenland has one aircraft, four helicopters and four ships. In addition to 
enforcing sovereignty, they handle fishing inspection and search and rescue operations. Six 
sleds powered by 80 dogs patrol the remote northeastern part.”387 This is compounded by 
the immense size of Greenland, which is the world’s largest non-continental island and 
over three times the size of Texas.388 The Arctic Council highlights that “Greenland’s 
icecap covers 81 percent of its area, leaving 15 percent of the coastline inhabitable…[and] 
the population density is the lowest in the world.”389 Gronholt-Pedersen goes on to 
emphasize that, “Denmark has no satellites to monitor traffic around Greenland. In 2018, 
it started receiving a few satellite images a day from the European Union’s Maritime Safety 
Agency, but they aren’t always detailed enough for military purposes.”390 This analysis is 
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confirmed by a Danish government-sponsored review of user’s space activities, 
highlighting the Defence Command Denmark’s (DCDA), “main task is surveillance and 
enforcement of sovereignty, which is undertaken with assistance from various radar 
satellites, including Radarsat2, Sentinel 1 & 2 and Tecsar.”391 Although these satellites 
have the capability to provide high spatial resolution imagery, the report highlights JACO’s 
need for national solutions to improve access for real-time data and access to satellite and 
drone-generated data. The report proposes further Danish investment to establish a ground 
station in Greenland and a datahub that would increase the speed of access and prevent 
data gaps to provide real-time monitoring and intelligence collection.392 
The government security review also highlights recent Danish advances to improve 
navigation, monitoring, and situational awareness within the Arctic. It highlights the 
Danish Maritime Authority’s (DMA) recent success in leading a joint regional project 
funded by the Nordic Council of Ministers and currently run by Norway.393 ArcticWeb 
increases maritime domain awareness by collecting user generated data to improve 
navigation and safety within the Arctic.394 Additionally, since 2013, Danish industry and 
university collaboration initiatives have built multiple small satellites to improve space 
research opportunities and specifically address Arctic challenges.395 These initiatives have 
seen the launch of the Aalborg University satellites (AAUsat) and GOMX series of 
nanosatellites that leverage the AIS and automatic dependent surveillance-broadcast 
(ADS-B) receivers for tracking ships and aircraft in the Arctic.396 The Ulloriaq (GOMX-
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4A) and GOMX-4B 6U satellites operate in tandem to demonstrate hyperspectral imaging, 
functionality of ADS-B and AIS receivers, and inter-satellite linking for coverage solutions 
over the Arctic.397 According to Danish commercial company GomSpace, the GOMX-4 
satellites launched in 2018 are a space collaboration project to provide Arctic surveillance 
and demonstrate the viability of building nanosatellite constellations for European high-
latitude applications. The GOMX-4 is a research and development mission between the 
Danish Defence Acquisition and Logistics Organization (DALO), DTU, and ESA. These 
recent space activities are evidence that an emerging space nation like Denmark, with a 
regional focus and limited budget, can provide niche capabilities and identify best practices 
to reinforce space collaborative initiatives to address shared surveillance and 
communications challenges within the region. 
Additionally, in a 2020 interview with Reuters, Danish Defense Minister Trine 
Bramsen stated, “Denmark is taking steps towards strengthening the Armed Forces’ 
surveillance and presence [within the Arctic].”398 This statement follows a July 2020 
meeting between then-U.S. Secretary of State Michael Pompeo and Denmark’s Foreign 
Minister Jeppe Kofod, where Denmark and the United States reaffirmed their commitment 
to building situational awareness through continued coordination and cooperation to 
address shared challenges within the region.399 These statements also coincide with the 
U.S. Air Force’s 2020 Arctic Strategy published in July 2020, which called for the U.S. 
Air Force and Space Force to “commit to enhancing its northernmost missile defense 
capabilities, exploring new surveillance and communications technologies and updating its 
dilapidated infrastructure in the region.”400  
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Denmark has made recent strides to increase defense funding and address Arctic 
challenges. Nordenman highlights that the 2018 Danish defense agreement, “sets out policy 
priorities and funding levels for Danish defense between 2018 and 2023, [which] includes 
a 20 percent increase in Danish defense spending.”401 Additionally, a recent political 
agreement to invest in Arctic capabilities from the governments of Denmark, Greenland, 
and the Faroe Islands, promised an estimated 240 million dollars to strengthen Danish 
Defence capabilities in the Arctic and the North Atlantic.402 The agreement emphasized 
that the Kingdom of Denmark has a “special responsibility in regards to defence and 
security in the Arctic and the North Atlantic…The Danish Defence will be strengthened 
with new capabilities to monitor the increased activity in the region. A task which is best 
solved in close cooperation with the United States and Arctic Allies, founded on NATO 
and in respect of international agreements.”403 In a joint statement between Secretary of 
State Blinken and Danish Foreign Minister Kofod in May 2021, Blinken emphasized U.S. 
and Danish partnership within the Arctic, stating, “We share a commitment to Arctic 
security. We very much welcome Denmark’s recent decision to invest more than $240 
million in North Atlantic and Arctic defense in coordination with the governments of 
Greenland and the Faroe Islands.”404 This investment in space activities is evidence that 
Denmark understands the challenges ahead and is demonstrating a willingness to address 
space capability gaps specific to surveillance and domain awareness within the region. 
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b. Ballistic Missile Defense 
 The Kingdom of Denmark, via Greenland, hosts the ballistic missile early warning 
radar system at the joint Danish and American Thule Air Base. Initially established in 1943 
as a weather and radio station to support allied operations in the North Atlantic during 
World War II, Thule Air Base in northwest Greenland is the United States’ most northern 
installation.405 During the postwar years, the United States sought a long-term solution to 
maintain its strategic foothold in the Arctic region. U.S. Space Force historical documents 
highlight the geostrategic location of Thule, stating, “the shortest route from the U.S. to the 
Soviet Union’s most important industrial areas was over the North Pole, and Thule is at the 
precise midpoint between Moscow and New York.”406 Additionally, they point out the 
strategic partnership between the United States and Denmark in the Arctic relating to the 
early warning and missile defense mission. In 1951, Denmark and the United States signed 
an agreement “for the use of facilities in Greenland by NATO forces in defense of the 
NATO area known as the Greenland Defense Area.”407 This agreement continues today. 
In 1961, the United States installed a ballistic missile early warning system 
(BMEWS) radar at the joint Danish and American Thule Air Base, and later upgraded the 
system to a solid-state, phased-array system in 1987.408 Denmark approved the current 
Upgraded Early Warning Radar (UEWR) system in 2004, with its construction completed 
in 2008.409 Although further upgrades were made to the system in 2018, the system’s 
mission remains to “provide detection and tracking of ballistic missiles and interceptors, 
and classification of space objects.”410 Complementary systems that contribute to the 
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United States’ UEWR system are located in Clear Air Force Station, Alaska, Beale Air 
Force Base (AFB), California, Cape Cod Air Force Station, Massachusetts, and Royal Air 
Force (RAF) Fylingdales, United Kingdom.411 In a 2020 DOD News interview, General 
John W. Raymond, U.S. Space Force Chief of Space Operations, emphasized the 
importance of Thule Air Base to U.S. homeland defense, stating, “If you look at one of the 
most critical missions that we do, and that’s missile warning, the Arctic is our front edge 
of that mission. We do that mission at Thule, Greenland, north of the Arctic Circle, with 
our space professionals that are assigned there at Thule Air Base.”412  
Additionally, the Kingdom of Denmark possesses three Iver Huitfeldt class frigates 
with Signal Multibeam Acquisition Radar for Targeting L-Band (SMART-L) air and 
surface radars capable of targeting ballistic missiles at an advertised range of 1,000 km.413 
In an interview from 2020, Captain Claus Andersen, head of the capabilities division and 
executive member in the Maritime Theater Missile Defense (MTMD) forum from the 
Royal Danish Navy, commented, “as part of our Arctic strategy we have had a frigate in 
the Arctic. The Iver Huitfeldt class frigate Peter Willemoes went up into the Denmark 
Straits and to Nuuk and up to Disko Bay on the western part of Greenland.”414 Within the 
interview, he emphasized the importance of an integrated air and missile defense (IAMD) 
network in the North Atlantic and the Arctic with NATO allies and in particular the United 
States. However, he also noted that although Denmark could achieve similar results 
through the procurement of the AEGIS combat system to meet interoperability needs, “we 
need to find a way where we can cooperate…with the U.S. as our main partner, but also to 
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keep Danish industry in…[and] cooperate with our European partners.”415 This focus has 
seen the Kingdom of Denmark integrated into the NATO ballistic missile defense (BMD) 
mission since 2014, with Denmark advertising that one SMART-L radar system can cover 
all of the Kingdom of Denmark’s Arctic territory.416 As part of the agreement between 
NATO and Denmark in 2014, “Denmark intends to contribute at least one frigate outfitted 
with a radar system to the NATO BMD mission.”417  
c. Space Situational Awareness 
Similar to the BMD mission area above, the Kingdom of Denmark, via Greenland, 
has also contributed to the SSA mission area since the 1960s through collaboration at the 
joint Danish and American Thule Air Base. During the radar site’s primary operations to 
provide early warning and missile defense, the radar also contributes to space surveillance 
and space control missions that get coordinated through the U.S. space surveillance 
network (SSN). The U.S. Space Force’s 12th Space Warning Squadron (SWS) stationed at 
Thule Air Base conducts space surveillance and space control missions by detecting and 
tracking polar-orbiting satellites from the UEWR system.418 According to the U.S. Space 
Force, the 12th SWS under Space Delta 4 is responsible for providing “space surveillance 
data on earth-orbiting objects to the 18th Space Control Squadron at Vandenberg Space 
Force Base, California, in support of United States Space Command’s space control 
missions.”419 The UEWR system classifies space objects and operates in the ultra-high 
frequency band (UHF) with an active aperture of 84 ft. diameter with an overall radar 
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height of 120 ft.420 Thule Air Base’s radar provides 240 degrees of coverage over the 
Arctic Ocean and the northern Russian coast with an advertised effective tracking range of 
up to 3,000 miles or approximately 5,000 kilometers.421 Considering most LEO polar-
orbiting satellites are at a range between 200 to 1000 km, the capability and location of this 
radar facility are critical to the BMD and SSA missions within the Arctic.422 
Although the Kingdom of Denmark does not maintain a national SSA program, it 
is a participating member state in ESA SSA Programme.423 Similar to Norway discussed 
previously, through ESA SSA Programme, Denmark contributes to monitoring and 
predicting space weather, detecting near-Earth objects (NEO), and conducting space 
surveillance and tracking (SST) through an integrated network of participating European 
member state’s space infrastructure.424 Additionally, in April 2018, the Danish Ministry 
of Defense signed an agreement with USSTRATCOM (now with USSPACECOM) to 
share SSA services and information.425 At the time, Major General Agner Rokos, on behalf 
of the Danish Defence Command and the Danish Ministry of Defence, emphasized the 
strategic importance of the agreement. He stated, “For Denmark as an emerging space 
nation, partnerships are highly valuable. The signing of the agreement to share Space 
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Situational Awareness ensures not only information sharing but will further build on the 
close relationship between USSTRATCOM and the Danish Defence.”426  
Furthermore, Denmark’s research-based satellite manufacturer GomSpace is a 
participating member in the European Commission’s proposal for a future European space 
traffic management (STM) capability.427 The EU’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation 
program seeks to “strengthen the European public and private space sector, encourage an 
innovative, competitive, and profitable space industry, as well as a research community 
that develops and runs space infrastructure.”428 Although the program acknowledges the 
significant partnerships European nations within the EU and ESA have with the United 
States through SSA and STM information and data sharing agreements, the EU’s STM 
program seeks a European alternative. The proposal highlights European interests, “to 
ensure sovereignty, autonomy and leadership in this domain whilst reducing this 
dependability, the European Commission started to work on an independent SSA/SST 
capability.”429 As with its other space-based programs, Denmark leverages its membership 
in the EU, NATO, and the Arctic Council to ensure its scientific, security, and economic 
space interests are met through international collaboration. This additional STM capability 
has the potential to provide additional capacity to a crucial U.S. mission area within the 
Arctic. 
d. Space Ground Infrastructure 
 Much like the BMD and SSA mission areas above, the Kingdom of Denmark, via 
Greenland, contributes to the United States’ polar telemetry, tracking, and command 
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(TT&C) capability within the Arctic. Since the 1960s, Thule Air Base has hosted an Air 
Force satellite command and control facility to track and communicate with DOD, 
government, and allied satellites in polar orbit.430 Thule Air Base in Greenland host a U.S. 
AFSCN node approximately 3.5 miles northeast of the main base.431 The AFSCN node is 
operated by Detachment 1, 23rd Space Operations Squadron (SOPS) which reports to the 
50th Space Wing at Schriever Air Force Base.432 According to the U.S. Space Force, “their 
primary function is to track and communicate with satellites in polar orbit as part of the Air 
Force Satellite Control Network.”433 This AFSCN node provides TT&C services for over 
195 satellites operated by the U.S. DOD, government, and allies.434 In a 2020, DOD News 
interview, General Raymond, Chief of Space Operations, stressed the geographical 
advantage Greenland provides to space operations, stating, “If you look at the key terrain 
aspect of that environment, we also command and control satellites. If you’re going to 
command and control satellites that are in polar orbits…that geography and the position on 
the globe…makes it an extremely advantageous place to operate from.”435 
However, it should be noted that the Kingdom of Denmark does not own or operate 
any national space ground infrastructure outside of the access it provides to the United 
States and NATO. A PWC report from 2017 on analyzing satellite infrastructure needs 
within the Kingdom of Denmark, highlighted that “Denmark has no common satellite data 
infrastructure, and Danish users retrieve data according to ability and need through 
different providers.”436 Although Denmark does not possess national space ground 
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infrastructure within its territory, it is a significant consumer of space-generated 
information and space infrastructure in the Arctic through multiple collaborative initiatives 
through ESA, the EU, NATO, and bilateral partnerships. However, a Danish Ministry of 
High Education and Science report from 2020 highlighted Danish governmental agencies’ 
desire to establish a ground station in Greenland, create datahubs for space-generated 
information, and increase space ground infrastructure to mitigate “inadequate geographic 
coverage, timeliness and the price of the data.”437 Subsequently, in February 2021, a 
Danish political agreement between the governments of Denmark, Greenland, and the 
Faroe Islands to fund Danish Arctic defense capabilities, allocated approximately 10 
million U.S. dollars to fund a proposed ground station and coastal radars in Greenland.438 
C. NATO AND THE ARCTIC 
As a possible alternative to bilateral or regional cooperation amongst the Arctic 
states, this section highlights a possible intergovernmental solution that addresses the 
second posed hypothesis within Chapter One. Part C discusses building intergovernmental 
space collaborative capacity within the Arctic through NATO cooperation. As the above 
case studies show, NATO member states within the Arctic possess niche capabilities that 
could be leveraged to create an allied space network within the Arctic. This section seeks 
to answer how the United States might leverage its cooperation with the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization (NATO) to benefit from an alliance space policy for the Arctic and 
whether NATO can build space collaborative capacity amongst its members and partners 
within the Arctic to support its stated strategic objectives in an era of polar great power 
competition. Although the space domain is outside of the geographic region defined in 
Article 6 of the North Atlantic Treaty,439 NATO’s 2030 policy highlights that the dynamic 
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and rapidly evolving nature of the domain, combined with the opportunities it presents, 
“have made outer space a new theatre for geopolitical competition.”440 In July 2018, at the 
Brussels Summit, allied leaders issued a declaration recognizing space as “essential to a 
coherent Alliance deterrence and defense posture, [and] have agreed to develop an 
overarching NATO Space Policy.”441 By December of 2019, allied leaders not only agreed 
on such a policy but also recognized space as a new operational domain.442 Although 
NATO’s space policy is not region-specific due to the cross-boundary nature of the space 
domain, this section investigates how a comprehensive alliance space policy specific to the 
Arctic region would address the United States’ Arctic-specific challenges with member 
states and partners that have vested interests in Arctic affairs. Like NATO’s approach to 
its south, NATO could articulate a consistent, clear, and coherent approach to its North.443 
Such a strategy could stimulate regional space cooperation and support collaborative 
efforts through resource investment in shared regional objectives through multilateral 
cooperation. 
As discussed previously, space solutions are uniquely qualified to meet the harsh 
operating environment in the Arctic with their reduced physical footprint, large coverage 
areas, and ability to span across international boundaries. As highlighted in NATO’s recent 
space policy, “the information gathered and delivered through satellites is critical for 
NATO activities, operations and missions, including collective defense, crisis response, 
and [cooperative security].”444 Due to the nascent and emerging space programs of many 
of NATO’s Arctic members and partners, coupled with the competition for resources due 
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to the competing strategic requirements of the United States, an alliance space policy for 
the Arctic would focus on space force enhancement to include intelligence, surveillance, 
and reconnaissance, shared early warning, terrestrial and space environmental monitoring, 
satellite communications, and PNT. These capabilities directly address NATO’s strategic 
capability gaps and limited capacity in C3ISR inclusive of limited domain awareness, 
satellite communications and PNT services. A comprehensive alliance space policy for the 
Arctic would provide region specific solutions by, with, and through member and partner 
countries with interest in Arctic affairs.  
The adoption of an alliance space policy for the Arctic as an alternative to only 
bilateral agreements would be an evolutionary adaptation for the alliance commensurate 
with NATO’s expansion into other mission areas. As pointed out in John R. Deni’s work 
on NATO’s enduring presence, this capabilities aggregate model seeks to balance 
externally by aggregating the capabilities of individual states, “allowing them to each 
leverage the collective capabilities of the whole and thereby better their security 
situation.”445 Similar to the Mediterranean Dialogue highlighted within the NATO 2030 
policy, an Arctic Dialogue emphasizing an alliance space policy for the region, and 
leveraging Deni’s ideas, could “build regional security and stability and achieve better 
mutual understanding amongst member states.”446 Arctic participants could “engage with 
NATO both collectively and individually, including in political dialogue on current space 
security issues.”447 Additionally, related to Deni’s ideas, Arctic participants could 
“develop individual cooperative programs with NATO, outlining the array of activities or 
events they could engage in, including [space] defense planning and [organization] reform, 
observation of and participation in exercises, intelligence sharing, [combined acquisition 
programs, and cooperation in civil space programs].”448  
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In line with the NATO 2030 report, NATO “should shift from the current demand-
driven approach to an interest-driven approach and consider providing more stable and 
predictable resource streams for partnership activities.”449 A capabilities-based and 
interest-driven approach to build allied and partner space collaborative capacity within the 
Arctic could provide an evolutionary concept that drives operational requirements across 
the combined allied and partner force, with key interest in Arctic affairs, to field capabilities 
that can provide a mutually beneficial competitive advantage within the region.450 
Although the adoption of a NATO space policy and the declaration of space as an 
operational domain is an evolutionary adaptation and is commendable as a step forward, it 
may require a complementary and comprehensive implementation strategy specific to 
countries with key interests to receive tangible results. As NATO considers its role and 
responsibilities in the space domain specific to polar great power competition, as well as 
its role in complementing the EU members states’ Arctic strategies, NATO could seek 
complementary solutions that prevent unnecessary duplication of efforts and waste 
resources that prevent interoperability and aggregation of capabilities. As highlighted in 
the NATO 2030 report, “Rather than developing new mechanisms… concerted effort is 
needed to build trust and make fuller use of existing arrangements and identified areas of 
cooperation.”451 
Fortunately, as discussed previously, NATO is well established in the Arctic with 
a considerable network of members and partners within and around the Arctic region. 
Member states contribute to space activities in the Arctic through bilateral cooperation like 
NORAD and the areas of cooperation mentioned earlier in this chapter. Additionally, 
intergovernmental cooperation through the EU, ESA, NORDEFCO, and the Five Eye 
intelligence-sharing alliance provide avenues to encourage burden-sharing and addressed 
areas of mutual interest within the space domain. This intricate network of alliances and 
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partnerships within the Arctic provides existing intergovernmental forums and multilateral 
cooperative security initiatives for NATO to nest its stated objectives within the space 
domain. 
As highlighted within the NATO 2030 policy, but applied to the Arctic, NATO 
could “put itself at the centre of [this] informal system of overlapping organizations and 
bilateral/multilateral relationships to respond to threats and stabilise the region.”452 Alyson 
Bailes, a foreign policy expert and professor at the University of Iceland, pointed out in 
2010, that the current Arctic community “cannot lobby in NATO as a bloc because of 
Swedish and Finnish non-membership.”453 Additionally, she highlighted that “the region’s 
countries that do have a ‘vote’ in NATO are among the Alliance’s smallest members in 
population terms.”454 However, this extensive network of partnerships has seen numerous 
regional exercises both within the EU and NATO, with standing military forces dedicated 
to the area. Currently, the EU possesses the Nordic Battlegroup supporting the Common 
Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) of the EU.455 Although not an EU nation, Norway 
contributes forces to this expeditionary force in readiness. As an effort to operate 
autonomously outside of NATO on security matters, if necessary, the EU Nordic 
Battlegroup along with NORDEFCO and NORAD, are clear indications from regional 
partners that regional security and issues will move ahead regardless of NATO insistence 
and resourcing. Although NATO’s Arctic members and partners, apart from the United 
States, individually have little ambition to become significant space players, collectively 
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they have the potential to significantly increase their aggregate capabilities and perhaps 
their relative standing regarding others in Europe.456  
 In considering the challenges of an alliance space policy for the Arctic, 
understanding the geopolitical interests of the respective countries is important as well as 
the domestic politics. Although, there are significant issues that NATO must overcome to 
implement an alliance space policy for the Arctic, Arctic nations have historically been 
more open to cooperation than their larger European space counterparts due to their 
common interests, limited military capacity, and shared principles of democratic ideals. A 
key challenge that must be overcome is what Olivier Schmitt describes as quality amongst 
potential partners within the region.457 Schmitt states, “a country lacking in at least some 
recent technologies will face interoperability problems with other countries in a gradually 
integrated battlefield.”458 Member and partner nascent and emerging space programs will 
lack exquisite capabilities, but what they lack in capability, can be mitigated by an interest-
driven approach. Additionally, expansion of NATO in the Arctic has historically been 
escalatory to Russia and has been limited to maintain a low-tension cooperative sphere 
between Russia and its western counterparts in the Arctic. The dual-use domain of space 
could mitigate this escalation with the right messaging across allied and partner civil, 
commercial, and defense agencies focusing space solutions on terrestrial monitoring, 
communications, and force-enhancement capabilities that provide benefits across the harsh 
Arctic operating environment. Furthermore, Deni highlights that, “NATO’s member states 
often have different security interests, threat perceptions, and strategic objectives.”459 
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However, Deni emphasized, in the end “they all look to NATO as a primary means of 
fulfilling their interests and meeting their objectives.”460 
Mutually beneficial alliances and partnerships are crucial to building an alliance 
space policy for the Arctic. Space power theorist and policy expert, Clay Moltz, 
emphasizes the benefits of shared space situational awareness and collective military action 
stating, “This ‘community policing’ approach is one that has never before been attempted 
in space, but it may succeed because of shared military interests in maintaining safe access 
to the valuable information that travels through space and the unique observations possible 
from space-based assets.”461 The United States could benefit from a NATO focused on 
building space collaborative capacity within the Arctic that leverages members and 
partners and deters potential adversaries from hostile military activities against member 
interests in the Arctic. The 2020 U.S. Defense Space Strategy emphasized, “space-based 
capabilities are integral to modern life in the United States and around the world and are 
an indispensable component of U.S. military power. Ensuring the availability of these 
capabilities is fundamental to establishing and maintaining military superiority across all 
domains and to advancing regional security and economic prosperity.”462 The same can 
be said about NATO and space capabilities within the Arctic. Retaining a competitive 
advantage in the Arctic is a strategic choice. As NATO grapples with competing budgetary 
requirements, rising polar great power competition, and significant capability gaps within 
the region, it cannot assume that its northern flank will continue to be protected in the 
absence of sustained attention to both policy and investment choices. NATO will 
eventually have to choose whether to adapt and seek to build a collaborative comprehensive 
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V. CONCLUSION 
This thesis sought to answer how the United States might benefit from a cooperative 
space strategy for the Arctic and whether the United States must build space collaborative 
capacity within the Arctic to achieve its stated strategic objectives within the region. 
Although it is clear from the evidence presented that the United States has the resources, 
infrastructure, and technological capability to address Arctic capability gaps through 
national space-based solutions, competing requirements and constrained budgets have 
consistently limited the success of such national initiatives. This chapter summarizes the 
presented research and analyzes the case studies presented in Chapter Four against the 
opportunities and challenges of building U.S. allied and partner space collaborative 
capacity within the Arctic. Additionally, the proposed hypotheses for answering the major 
research question are revisited and evaluated based on gathered quantitative and qualitative 
data. Furthermore, areas for enhanced cooperation are identified based on shared political 
objectives, historic areas of collaboration, and political will as expressed by current space 
strategies and policies of allies and partners within the region. 
A. SUMMARY OF RESEARCH 
Space collective action between U.S. allies and partners within the Arctic must first 
start by recognizing shared geopolitical objectives and shared capability shortfalls. Recent 
U.S. strategic focus on the Arctic and the space domain sees progress in implementing a 
collaborative space concept. In 2016, Ash Carter, then U.S. Secretary of Defense, stated, 
“From secure communications, to reconnaissance satellites, to allowing for precise 
navigation and targeting, space is integral to our operations… [It is] in the self-interest of 
every nation to advance the common interest of a free and stable environment in space.”463 
This point was further emphasized with NATO declaring space an operational domain in 
December 2019, recognizing emerging threats from competing great powers and the 
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necessity to collectively defend strategic assets within the space domain and enhance space 
security cooperation to support national, joint, and combined operations.464  
The United States recognizes the geostrategic challenges within the Arctic, has 
communicated its strategic objectives to build allied and partner space collaborative 
capacity, and sees key partners reciprocate with a recognition of shared objectives. The 
2017 DOD International Space Cooperation Strategy codified  
the DOD’s approach for invigorating cooperation and collaboration with 
trusted allies and partners across the spectrum of DOD’s space-related 
activities and mission areas. The key purposes for this expanded 
international space cooperation and collaboration are expanded 
interoperability, sustainability, mission assurance, and assured access to 
critical capabilities in crisis and contingency operations.465 
Additionally, the 2020 Defense Space Strategy continues to emphasize the strategic 
importance of “a robust and prolific arrangement of alliances and partnerships built on 
trust, common values, and shared national interests. This approach creates an important 
advantage for the United States and its allies and partners.”466 Although these emerging 
space security cooperation initiatives primarily represent an application of the military 
instrument of national power, a comprehensive security cooperation plan inclusive of all 
instruments of national power (diplomatic, informational, and economic) across the U.S. 
civil, commercial, and defense sectors is necessary to build U.S. allied and partner space 
collaborative capacity in the Arctic.467 A comprehensive space cooperation concept would 
seek to enhance allied and partner space capacity and capabilities, provide access for 
terrestrial infrastructure supporting space capabilities and build partner nation support of 
U.S. interests in the Arctic through bilateral, interorganizational, and regional collaborative 
forums.  
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Recognizing the increasingly congested nature of the space domain, the United 
States has signed space data-sharing agreements that contribute to SSA and space traffic 
management (STM) with over 26 countries worldwide, inclusive of Arctic states Canada, 
Denmark, Finland, and Norway as of May 2021.468 Moreover, in 2014, the U.S. Strategic 
Command (USSTRATCOM) and the European Space Agency (ESA) signed a space data-
sharing agreement to exchange PNT data, radio-frequency information, and planned orbital 
maneuvers of some European satellites.469 Denmark, Finland, Norway, and Sweden are 
member states of ESA with Canada holding a special status as a Cooperating State. 
Additionally, Iceland began its path to membership in 2017.470 Furthermore, ESA is 
developing the Space Situational Awareness Programme with 19 member states (inclusive 
of Denmark, Finland, Sweden, and Norway) and in collaboration with the U.S. Space Force 
and the Department of Commerce.471  
The current geostrategic operating environment within the Arctic requires space-
based solutions for the United States and its allies and partners within the region to 
communicate, navigate, and maintain awareness to achieve relevant national security, civil, 
environmental, and economic goals. Whether this is accomplished through national means, 
bilateral engagement, multilateral cooperation, or through intergovernmental forums will 
be determined by the United States, as its peer-competitors will fill the leadership vacuum 
if the United States does not meet the moment.  
Emerging space collaborative concepts coming out of recent presidential 
administrations established the structure, created the reward system, and implemented 
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coherent policies to enact real change in the region. However, the emerging concepts were 
largely underfunded, unfocused, and lacked the domestic political willpower to see 
significant shift in budgets towards increasing capability within the region significantly. 
With continued expansion of space-data sharing agreements along with established norms 
within the space domain amongst allies and partners, they will likely increase information 
sharing, establish best practices, and encourage interoperability amongst themselves going 
forward. Whether this continued engagement will exceed the current status quo is yet to be 
seen. The Biden administration’s direction in space policy and Arctic affairs will drive 
future U.S. space collective action amongst Arctic allies and partners and dictate whether 
the political will is present to allocate the required resources to address U.S. strategic 
capability gaps within the region. If it does not, Russia and China will likely take the 
opportunity to solidify their gains, expand their influence, and make the situation 
significantly more challenging for the next administration. 
B. CASE STUDY ASSESSMENT 
This thesis examined the possible contributions of Norway and Denmark within the 
Arctic to assess how the United States might benefit from allied and partner space 
cooperation in the region. Based on the evidence within the case study on Norwegian space 
activities, Norway can make a significant contribution to both the United States and 
NATO’s space security initiatives within the Arctic. Norwegian contributions to Arctic 
communications, launch facilities, Arctic domain awareness, SSA, and space ground 
infrastructure provide avenues to build space collaborative capacity through key mission 
areas that could benefit a cooperative space strategy to address U.S. strategic capability 
gaps within the region. Due to Norway’s unique proximity to the polar region and its 
extensive maritime area of responsibility, the evidence suggests that Norway could be a 
gateway to the Arctic and the polar space above it. Based on the evidence presented within 
the chapter, it is likely that Norwegian and United States bilateral cooperation in space 
activities should expand. 
Additionally, based on the evidence within the case study on the Kingdom of 
Denmark’s space activities, Denmark has been integral to the BMD, SSA, TT&C and 
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domain awareness mission areas of NATO and the United States within the Arctic since 
the late 1950s. Its geographically advantageous position along the transpolar corridor puts 
it at a strategic crossroads for polar great power competition and makes it an ideal location 
for space surveillance of polar orbiting satellites. Based on the evidence presented within 
the chapter, there is a strong need for continued cooperation between Denmark and the 
United States in the above mission areas. However, it must be noted that the Kingdom of 
Denmark is an Arctic state via Greenland. If Greenland seeks full independence from 
Denmark, the United States will require future negotiations with Greenland to sustain space 
collaboration initiatives and reaffirm land use agreements.  
Furthermore, the analysis on NATO in the Arctic highlighted the mutual interests 
of Arctic allies and partners within the region. Based on the evidence within the chapter, 
as a possible alternative to bilateral or regional cooperation, the United States could benefit 
from a NATO focused on building space collaborative capacity within the Arctic that 
leverages members and partners and deters potential adversaries from hostile military 
activities against member interests in the Arctic. Although Canada has previously been a 
major detractor of NATO involvement in the Arctic due its reluctance for military 
intervention in the region, recent Russian and Chinese emerging competition in the region 
has seen Canada advocate for more NATO involvement.472 This, combined with 
consistent Norwegian advocacy of greater NATO involvement, should encourage the 
United States to leverage its transatlantic partnerships to generate greater Arctic presence 
and investment in space-based solutions. 
As a possible alternative to bilateral or regional cooperation amongst the Arctic 
states, this section highlights a possible intergovernmental solution that addresses the 
second posed hypothesis within Chapter One. 
 
472 Andrea Charron, “NATO, Canada and the Arctic,” Canadian Global Affairs Institute, last 
modified September 2017, https://www.cgai.ca/nato_canada_and_the_arctic. 
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C. EVALUATION OF THE HYPOTHESES  
Based off the initial literature review, this thesis introduced three possible 
hypotheses for how the United States could best build space collaborative capacity and 
benefit from space cooperation in the Arctic. The first hypothesis proposed that the Arctic 
would likely remain a region of cooperation between the Arctic states, with the United 
States loosely benefiting from established cooperative norms within the region. Based on 
the evidence presented within the thesis, ongoing space collaborative initiatives between 
Canada, Denmark, Norway, Finland, and the United States within the space domain 
through civil, commercial, and defense space cooperation initiatives are witnessing greater 
regional space collaborative efforts to address Arctic specific concerns. Although 
commercial solutions like proliferated LEO satellite constellations and high-altitude 
platforms may solve communications, Earth Observation, and PNT issues in the future, 
current initiatives for partnered investments to address shared regional challenges are 
increasing collaboration across the emerging defense and industrial space activities. 
Increased burden sharing through Arctic allied and partner niche capabilities and 
geographic advantages provide an avenue to address U.S. strategic capability gaps within 
the region. This would suggest that the Arctic is becoming a region of competition with the 
changing strategic environment, and U.S. allies and partners within the region are willing 
to engage in bilateral and multilateral approaches to addressed shared concerns within the 
Arctic. 
The second hypothesis proposed that longstanding Arctic intergovernmental 
forums could provide the structure necessary to stimulate regional space cooperation and 
support collaborative efforts through resource investment in shared regional objectives 
through multilateral cooperation. Evidence presented within the thesis, highlights 
intergovernmental forums that are addressing Arctic challenges through their respective 
shared regional interests. These include NATO, NORAD, the UN, EU, ESA, NORDEFCO, 
and the Nordic Council amongst others. Bilateral and multilateral space agreements will 
likely contribute to strengthening regional cooperation and increase U.S. allied and partner 
civil, commercial, and military space capabilities to promote peace and stability within the 
region, and ultimately advance U.S. national interests within the Arctic. An important 
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question that must be answered is not whether the U.S. should engage in space cooperation 
initiatives within the Arctic region, but rather, can the U.S. afford not to lead, considering 
the growing threat posed by the emerging polar great power competition and the 
geostrategic advantage space capabilities provide to the region’s security?  
A recent example of the United States leading an Arctic cooperative forum is the 
International Cooperative Engagement Program for Polar Research (ICE-PPR). According 
to the U.S. Office of Naval Research, “The International Cooperative Engagement Program 
for Polar Research (ICE-PPR) is an agreement between the partner nations’ defense 
departments and government agencies engaged in polar research to help advance polar 
science and technology.”473 Participating Arctic nations include the defense agencies of 
Canada, Denmark, Finland, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, and the United States. 
Although the working group is primarily focused on “environment, human performance, 
platforms, and situational awareness” within the Arctic, the fact that Sweden is 
participating in an Arctic defense collaborative forum contributing to space activities is a 
significant step forward. Sweden’s recent Arctic strategy published in 2020, further 
emphasized that “Sweden’s close relationship with the U.S. is of central importance for 
Sweden’s security and prosperity.”474 The strategy goes on to say that “Sweden wants to 
strengthen cooperation especially in the areas of polar research, innovation, trade, climate 
and the environment.”475 These areas are consistent with Sweden’s stance on a cooperative 
Arctic focused on scientific and environmental collaboration. In fact, since Russia’s 
invasion of Crimea in 2014, Sweden has increased its defense cooperation with the United 
States. 
 
473 “International Cooperative Engagement Program for Polar Research (ICE-PPR) Self-Forming 
Team: Advancing polar science and technology through international cooperation,” IARPC Collaborations, 
accessed March 12, 2021, https://www.iarpccollaborations.org/teams/International-Cooperative-
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474 Government Offices of Sweden, Sweden’s Strategy for the Arctic Region (Stockholm, SE: 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2020), 18, 
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The third hypothesis proposed in the thesis suggested that a more robust Arctic 
cooperative space strategy might fail to materialize due to a combination of regional 
specific challenges, such as nationalism, lack of dedicated resources, conflicting political 
goals, and a lack of sustained political leadership to implement long-term results. 
Challenges and common barriers to space collective action presented in Chapter Three 
provided evidence that a coherent and comprehensive strategy amongst the United States’ 
Arctic allies and partners could be difficult to achieve due to the conflicting organizational 
affiliations, competing domestic interests, and industrial competition related to the space 
domain. However, the chapter also provided evidence that a cooperative Arctic strategy is 
still feasible with bold and consistent leadership from the United States. 
In an interview with the Defense & Aerospace Report from 2019, Kasper Høeg-
Jensen, then the head of Denmark’s ministry of defense’s security policy and operations 
department, highlighted Danish leadership to foster closer collaboration between the 
Nordic nations and the United States. During the interview, he stated, “What we have been 
pushing for from the Danish side is actually to strengthen the Nordic-U.S. 
cooperation…We are a region that has different security affiliations, different relationships 
to the EU, to NATO. But we have a common relationship with the [United States.]”476 He 
went on to state, “NATO is the cornerstone of our security. But whatever we can do to 
draw Sweden and Finland closer to us and to NATO I think is positive.”477 Høeg-Jensen’s 
comments reiterate the strong shared political narratives of multilateralism and cooperation 
embedded in Nordic foreign policy and the shared interest in defense alignment with the 
United States against Russian and non-Arctic state aggression within the region.478  
Strong defense relationships between the Nordic countries and the United States 
reinforce this common relationship. As mentioned previously, Denmark, Iceland, and 
 
476 Vago Muradian, “Denmark’s Kasper on NATO, Nordic Cooperation, Greenland, China, Climate,” 
Defense & Aerospace Report, accessed May 29, 2021, https://defaeroreport.com/2019/04/03/denmarks-
kasper-on-nato-nordic-cooperation-greenland-china-climate/. 
477 Vago Muradian, “Denmark’s Kasper on NATO, Nordic Cooperation, Greenland, China, Climate.” 
478 North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Arctic Narratives and Political Values: Arctic States, China, 
and NATO, Prepared by the NATO Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence, ISBN: 978–9934-564-
65-9, December 2019, 4–5, https://stratcomcoe.org/cuploads/pfiles/arctic_political_values_11dec2019.pdf. 
129 
Norway are founding members of the NATO alliance, and Finland and Sweden are 
enhanced opportunities partners. Additionally, all five Nordic countries have recently 
signed separate defense agreements with the United States reinforcing their commitment 
to Transatlantic security initiatives. In 2004, then-Secretary of State Colin Powell, along 
with Denmark and Greenland representatives, signed a supplemental defense agreement 
on Greenland that reinforced bilateral defense commitments and recognized Greenland’s 
change in status “from colony to that of an equal part of the Kingdom of Denmark.”479 In 
2016, the United States and Iceland signed a joint declaration encouraging future 
cooperation, and the United States “reaffirmed its 65-year-old commitment to the defense 
of Iceland, while Iceland agreed to continue allowing the United States and NATO to use 
Icelandic facilities in order to reinforce mutual security.”480  
Additionally, in 2018, Finland, Sweden, and the United States signed a Trilateral 
Statement of Intent between the respective countries’ defense departments that reinforced 
the strong defense relationships between the partners with an intent to “pursue an enhanced 
trilateral defense relationship…[that] strengthens respective bilateral defense 
arrangements, as well as multilateral agreements and arrangements.481 Furthermore, in 
April 2021, Antony Blinken, U.S. Secretary of State, signed the Supplementary Defense 
Cooperation Agreement (SDCA) with Norway. According to the Department of State, 
“The SDCA builds on the 1951 NATO Status of Forces Agreement to facilitate further 
development of opportunities for U.S. forces to train and exercise in Norway, promoting 
improved interoperability with Norwegian and other allied forces.”482 These agreements 
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should improve future collaboration and cooperation between the Nordic states and the 
United States and foster an increased U.S. military presence within the Arctic region. 
Although these strong defense relationships have built cooperation through 
multinational exercises within the Arctic in recent years and encouraged interoperability 
and increased coordination between the Nordic states and the United States, they have not 
yet created significant regional cooperation within the space domain. An example would 
be the Arctic Challenge exercises that include the air forces of the five Arctic states of the 
United States, Denmark, Finland, Norway, and Sweden as well as participation from 
Germany, the Netherlands, and the UK. The Arctic Challenge exercises provide cross-
border training (CBT) between Sweden, Finland, and Norway, and an opportunity for 
large-scale aviation maneuvers that develop national capabilities and encourage 
interoperability.483 Although these exercises do not focus on the space domain, it should 
be noted that each of the participating Arctic states’ have space capabilities within their 
national Air Forces. This increased collaboration in one mission area could be translated 
into future opportunities within the space domain. Currently, space collective action has 
largely been limited to bilateral negotiations on key projects and systems. However, as 
addressed in the previous chapters, there is a growing trend for regional space collective 
action initiatives namely amongst Canada, Denmark, Norway, and the United States.  
D. AREAS OF FUTURE RESEARCH  
Although this thesis covered alliance and space power theory as it relates to the 
Arctic and space security, there are significant areas of study that this thesis only touched 
on. Incorporating smaller nations into large alliances and leveraging nascent programs in 
high-technology initiatives presents unique challenges. Additional areas of research could 
incorporate these national security affairs themes or deep dive into technical specifications 
and parameters in solving technical challenges addressing high-latitude operations. 
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High-latitude operations pose significant challenges to the Joint force’s ability to 
communicate and engage in command and control within the Arctic region. The U.S. 
military has consistently expressed concern about unreliable communications in the 
northern polar region as the Arctic lacks a robust land-based and satellite-based 
communications architecture. In a 2019 statement to Congress, USNORTHCOM 
prioritized the “Arctic as the front line in the defense of the United States,” but the U.S. 
military continues to underinvest in Arctic communications capabilities due to competing 
fiscal requirements.484 The recent publications of Arctic strategies across the military 
services and amongst Arctic allies and partners are a testament to the emerging geostrategic 
importance of the Arctic. The United States should consider leveraging the Homeland 
Defense Academic Symposium hosted by USNORTHCOM for further research ideas and 
areas of study.485 This symposium gathers academic and industry representatives from the 
United States and Canada to address NORAD and USNORTHCOM mission areas. 
Additionally, the United States should continue investment in the Center for Arctic Policy 
Studies located in Fairbanks, Alaska for Arctic specific research and areas of study related 
to polar mission areas.486  
E. CONCLUSION 
At an Arctic Council meeting in May 2019, then-U.S. Secretary of State Pompeo 
articulated the emerging threat in the Arctic when he stated, “the region has become an 
arena for power and for competition. And the eight Arctic states must adapt to this new 
future.”487 The 2019 U.S. DOD Arctic Strategy emphasized that the U.S. must prioritize 
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efforts to address the United States’ eroding competitive edge against China and Russia to 
ensure favorable balances of power in the Indo-Pacific and Europe with the Arctic as the 
geostrategic crossroad between these regions. A capabilities-based approach to build U.S. 
allied and partner space collaborative capacity within the Arctic region provides an 
evolutionary concept that drives operational requirements across the combined allied and 
partner force. This approach to field capabilities with shared multilateral regional interests 
can provide a mutually beneficial competitive advantage within the region.488 As 
identified in a recent national intelligence study, “The most powerful actors of the future 
will be states, groups, and individuals who can leverage material capabilities, relationships, 
and information in a more rapid, integrated, and adaptive mode than in generations 
past.”489 The U.S. and its Arctic allies and partners must seek innovative solutions to build 
bilateral, interorganizational, and regional space cooperation agreements across their 
respective civil, commercial, and defense sectors.490 The emerging strategic operating 
environment in the Arctic requires innovative solutions to address the emerging challenges 
and opportunities.  
Protecting U.S. national security interests in the Arctic requires an enduring 
aerospace and maritime-warning monitoring system that combines additional 
infrastructure along the U.S. northern border, additional C3ISR assets, improved aerospace 
early-warning systems, and an enduring maritime domain awareness presence to provide a 
responsive and resilient deterrent to Russian and Chinese influence within the Arctic. To 
deter potential peer competitors’ influence within the Arctic, the United States must first 
acknowledge the strategic relevance of space operations to the Arctic region and 
understand the civil, commercial, and defense space capabilities of U.S. Arctic allies and 
partners. Arctic awareness is crucial for deterrence, surveillance, and defense of the 
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homeland as well as power projection to maintain U.S. and partner sovereignty rights. 
Current strategic initiatives focus on the development of additional C3ISR space-based and 
terrestrial-based sensors as well as advancements and refurbishment of U.S. and Canada-
based missile defense systems.491 However, these initiatives largely ignore the strategic 
value of United States partners and allies within the region. The United States must 
leverage these additional allies and partners to enhance space operations and associated 
capabilities to increase access to currently denied areas, provide persistent C3ISR 
coverage, and facilitate collective operational and tactical responses to Arctic operations. 
These initiatives directly contribute to the defense of the Arctic as part of the United States 
homeland and are a focused effort to succeed in future polar great power competition within 
the Arctic. 
The United States has ignored the Arctic security environment for too long through 
underinvestment, leading to degraded facilities and capabilities within the region. The 
Arctic is the crossroads in this polar great power competition, and the United States must 
seek a more persistent, responsive, and resilient, allied and partner force to maintain U.S. 
allied and partner competitive advantages.492 In 2019, General David Goldfein, then-Air 
Force Chief of Staff, stated at the Conference of International Air Chiefs that “we’re far 
stronger together than we are individually.”493 This is the strategic message the United 
States must focus on to build space collaborative capacity within the Arctic that leverages 
U.S. allies and partners, increases U.S. prestige abroad, and deters potential adversaries 
from hostile military activities against U.S. national strategic interests in the Arctic. The 
2011 National Security Space Strategy emphasized, “Active U.S. leadership in space 
requires a whole-of-government approach that integrates all elements of national power, 
from technological prowess and industrial capacity to alliance building and diplomatic 
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engagement.”494 This same sentiment must be applied to the Arctic. The time to invest in 
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